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Abstract 
 
Between 1988 and 1998, Papua New Guinea and Bougainville were engaged in a 
violent and destructive civil war, resulting primarily from the economic and environmental 
consequences stemming from mining on Bougainville, as well as historic economic, ethnic 
and political cleavages. A ceasefire in 1998 set into motion the Bougainville peace process. 
This thesis aims to test the theory of cooperation, developed by Robert Axelrod, and attempts 
to locate evidence of his characteristics of successful cooperation within the Bougainville 
case. By analysing ten years of data sourced from the Papua New Guinea Post-Courier daily 
newspaper, using a qualitative content analysis method, this research found considerable 
evidence of Axelrod’s characteristics of cooperation. As a result, cooperation between the 
Papua New Guinean National Government and the then-newly formed Bougainville 
Government, has made considerable progress towards establishing a sustainable and lasting 
peace.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Research focus 
Bougainville province, now the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, is an island 
region off the eastern coast of Papua New Guinea. Despite being geographically a part of the 
Solomons Archipelago, politically Bougainville falls under the jurisdiction of Papua New 
Guinea. The Bougainville crisis was a complex and deeply-rooted conflict centred primarily 
upon the Panguna copper mine. The Panguna mine was the largest open-cast mine in the 
world, and generating approximately 20% of the revenue of the Papua New Guinea 
government. However the mining operation caused extreme environmental destruction, with 
the Bougainville people accusing the Bougainville Copper Limited mining company of 
failing to adequately compensate people for their land, and for the unfair distribution of 
mining revenues. Beginning in 1988, Bougainville was embroiled in a decade-long war with 
Papua New Guinea, labelled the most severe conflict in Oceania since the end of the Second 
World War. As a result of the fighting over 67,000 people (40% of the population) were 
internally displaced, and between 15-20,000 Bougainvilleans were killed. 
 
Numerous attempts were made to secure a lasting peace, and to bring the militant 
Bougainville factions and the Papua New Guinean government together to reconcile. These 
attempts ultimately succeeded in securing a permanent ceasefire, and the signing of the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement. The question now becomes: how can cooperation 
successfully develop, in a world without central authority, and where the parties involved 
have an incentive to defect? The primary focus of this research is to test the work of Robert 
Axelrod on the Bougainville case. Axelrod, in his work The Evolution of Cooperation, 
empirically determined the parameters, or characteristics, most common amongst 
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cooperatively-successful strategies in a simulated environment. The primary research 
question of this thesis is: 
 Are the characteristics necessary for the development of successful 
cooperation, as identified by Axelrod, present in post-crisis 
Bougainville, and if so, to what extent? 
 
The Bougainville case is also governed by certain parameters of broader game theory, 
relating to the nature of the interaction between parties and the duration of this interaction. 
The effect of these parameters are the focus of the secondary research question of this thesis: 
 As time progresses, do we see more cooperative behaviour being 
demonstrated between actors, or do they experience an increased 
incidence of defective, non-cooperative behaviour? 
 
To test these research questions a detailed coding frame was developed, using 
qualitative content analysis, to identify Axelrod’s characteristics of successful cooperation in 
the news media. This required analysing more than 1,300 articles from the Papua New 
Guinea Post-Courier daily newspaper, sourced from editions dating from 2001 to 2010. The 
articles are analysed for instances of cooperation or non-cooperation, and categorised 
according to the coding frame, in order to answer the primary and secondary research 
questions. 
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Structure of thesis 
Chapter two presents in depth the details of the Bougainville case study, specifically 
addressing the causes and course of the Bougainville crisis, and the burgeoning stages of the 
peace process. 
 
Chapter three presents a literature review, and is divided into two sections. The first 
section covers the seminal work of Robert Axelrod in the field of cooperation theory, and 
details his work in establishing the most desirable characteristics for facilitating successful 
cooperation. The second section outlines specific aspects of game theory relevant to this 
research, including specific dynamics of the Bougainville case. 
 
Chapter four outlines the methodology used to isolate the characteristics of 
cooperation identified by Axelrod in the Bougainville case. This involves using a qualitative 
methodology known as qualitative content analysis, to analyse and code ten years of articles 
sourced from the Papua New Guinea Post-Courier daily newspaper. 
 
Chapter five presents the findings and analysis of the qualitative content analysis. 
This chapter identifies the extent to which the Axelrod characteristics of cooperation are 
present in the Bougainville case. Chapter five also presents a time series analysis of the 
prevalence of defective behaviour. 
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Chapter 2: Bougainville 
 
This chapter provides a general overview of the island of Bougainville, followed by a 
detailed description of the events leading up to, and those which unfolded during, the 
Bougainville Crisis. 
 
 The island of Bougainville, in the Solomon archipelago (Fig. 1), was among the 
earliest inhabited areas of the Pacific, with evidence of human inhabitation dating back nearly 
29,000 years (Ogan 2005: 48). The Solomon archipelago and Bougainville had been sighted 
by a number of early European explorers: the Solomon Islands were first sighted by the 
Spanish explorer, de Mendana, in 1568. The North Solomon Islands were visited by the 
Dutch explorers, Schouten and Le Maire, in 1616. In 1768, the French explorer, Louis 
Antoine de Bougainville, sailed the eastern coast of the island which now bears his name 
(Spriggs 2005: 28). There are few sources of information on the pre-colonial and pre-mining 
periods of Bougainville: the fact that only one scholar – Douglas Oliver – has attempted 
anything resembling a general history of the island is testament to the lacunae in research 
(Griffin 2005: 199). There are a handful of reasons for the neglect of this subject. Prior to the 
commencement of mining operations on the island, Bougainville was seen as a “backwater” 
region of negligible consequence, and thus was paid little attention. In addition, the written 
records in existence are predominantly the works of foreigners, and as such are inherently 
biased or flawed: this was a hindrance prior to the people of Bougainville learning to record 
their oral histories in a lasting format (Griffin 2005: 199). 
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Fig. 1: Bougainville 
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The gaps in the historical knowledge of Bougainville create a challenge for 
contemporary studies on the region; without understanding the past it is difficult to 
comprehend the present and theorise the future. This thesis will rely heavily upon the edited 
volume of Bougainville Before the War, by Regan and Griffin, which amalgamates the 
original works of Douglas Oliver with contributions from specialists in Bougainville studies, 
as well as prominent leaders from the area. 
 
The Bougainville Crisis 
The Bougainville conflict is a multifaceted and immensely intricate case. The duration 
and complexity of the conflict is such that thousands upon thousands of pages of text have 
been devoted to its many aspects. While such a detailed description is not necessary here, it is 
vital to provide an overview of the events which occurred immediately prior to the outbreak 
of violence, and of the devastation which ensued. 
 
Establishment of the Panguna Mine 
To the wider world the most tangible cause of the Bougainville conflict was the issue 
of mining. In 1960 the discovery of large copper deposits was made on the island, and after a 
series of feasibility studies a mining operation was launched. In 1967 a major extraction pit 
was established at Panguna, in southern Bougainville, and rapidly drew the ire of locals. The 
mining operation was owned in majority by Cozinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) and 
functioned locally under the name Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) (Alley 2003: 228). 
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The establishment of this mine was lauded as being the means by which Papua New 
Guinea could achieve fiscal independence from Australia, of which Papua New Guinea was a 
territory. Charles Barnes, Minister of Australian Territories, underlined this in 1970 when he 
stated:  
“Our obligation is to build the standard of living up for the whole of the 
territory. And if we’re going to build the standard up just on coconuts and 
cocoa, I’m afraid their future isn’t too bright. If we get a few more of these 
mines, New Guinea will be self-sufficient and in a very good position, so 
that is our interest mainly. I think the people will eventually see it” (Coles-
Janess 1997).  
 
 
Throughout the 1970s, due to the huge mineral wealth of the island, the Australian 
Government and CRA were transforming Bougainville into the most advanced and 
westernised area of the entire South Pacific (Coles-Janess 1997). In spite of the 
modernisation driven by the activities of the Panguna mine, the local Bougainvillean people 
grew angry at the financial and environmental issues which it caused. While the mine 
generated local employment and training opportunities, and provided services and cash-flow 
injections into the local economy, the mine was also responsible for considerable 
environmental degradation, insufficient compensation to locals and was generally viewed as 
another example of indigenous exploitation by outsiders (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 25).  
 
With the advent of mining on the island, and the subsequent frustration of the people, 
various political options for Bougainville (independence, unity with the Solomon Islands, or 
remaining with Papua New Guinea) were debated. During the early 1970s the people of 
Bougainville had begun to demand greater autonomy from the central government, and in 
1974 a provincial government was established which encompassed Bougainville, Buka and 
its associated islands. At the time it became known as the North Solomons Province, but was 
subsequently referred to as Bougainville. Following the independence of Papua New Guinea 
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in 1975, the central government extended these same provincial arrangements to the rest of 
the nation (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 24-25). 
 
Following the commencement of mining in 1967, enabling legislation was passed 
which allowed for the compulsory acquisition of land for the purposes of mining, and 
circumvented the need for local consultation (Alley 2003: 228). Many villagers were already 
concerned with the intentions of both BCL and the Papua New Guinea government, believing 
that the government “are going to come and take our land away, without permission from us” 
(Coles-Janess 1997). The identity of the Bougainvillean people, and indeed of wider 
Melanesia, is derived from an all-encompassing affinity to the land. For the people of 
Bougainville, land: 
 
“…is our physical life; it is marriage; it is status; it is security; it is politics; in 
fact, it is our only world. We have little or no experience of social survival 
detached from the land. For us to be completely landless is a nightmare which 
no dollar in the pocket…will allay” (Alley 2003: 227).  
 
 
The desecration of local land caused heartache and dismay amongst the 
Bougainvillean people, and endangered their traditional ways of life (Boege 2010: 334). At 
the height of its operation the Panguna mine covered an area of 400 hectares and produced 
waste material in the order of hundreds of millions of tonnes (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 25). 
Much of this land was forcibly acquired from local families and communities, and was left 
economically useless as a result of the degradation caused by BCL. The local land served the 
communal imperative of providing a subsistence living for many families: much of the land 
had been used for gardens, and many waterways which were used for the collection of fish 
and seafood were left polluted (Alley 2003: 229; Coles-Janess 1997). In reality the land had a 
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much deeper value: it served as the “core dimension of their whole social, cultural and 
spiritual life” (Boege 2003: 334). As a result, while the loss of land was economically 
detrimental, there were also deep-penetrating psychosocial impacts and damage caused to the 
societal fabric of the people (Boege 2003: 334). 
 
The mounting frustration and anger at the destruction of their land was compounded 
by the unfair and disproportionate distribution of mine revenues. During the 17 years it was 
in operation the Panguna mine was an essential source of income for the Papua New Guinea 
government, with the mine providing the government with approximately 20% of its annual 
internal revenue, and approximately 44% of its export earnings (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 25; 
Alley 2003: 229). In the decade prior to the outbreak of the crisis, 60% of the mine profits 
went to the Papua New Guinea government; 35% to foreign shareholders; 5% was provided 
to the Bougainville provincial government; yet only 0.2% of profits were awarded to local 
landowners as royalty payments1 (Alley 2003: 229). 
 
Xenophobia 
In addition to the issues of mining and the resultant land degradation, there were 
mounting concerns from the Bougainville people towards those employed by BCL at the 
Panguna mine. These sentiments were not motivated by the mere fact that these people were 
employed by the mine, but rather by the types of people who were employed. Throughout the 
construction stage of the Panguna mine more than 10,000 people worked on the mine site: 
once the mine was opened a workforce of approximately 4,300 worked directly at the site, 
with many more involved in mine-related enterprises. The majority of these workers were 
                                                          
1 There are varying figures relating to the distribution of mine revenues, but they tend to fall within the same 
range. Initially the Papua New Guinea government received only 1.25% of mine profits, but after their 
independence this was renegotiated to 20%. However the Bougainvilleans themselves only received 5% of the 
share earned by the government – i.e. 5% of 1.25%, and later 5% of 20%. This translated as $600 for every $1 
million in profit, and later $10,000 for every $1 million in profit (Alley 2003: 229; Ewins 2002: 2). 
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non-Bougainvillean and hailed from other parts of Papua New Guinea. In addition, there 
were also a number of foreigners working on the island (Boege 2010: 333). There was 
growing resentment of the wealth being accumulated by the ‘redskins’2 of mainland Papua 
New Guinea, who were paid considerably more than local Bougainvilleans, and increased 
frustration at the presence of the “affluent expatriate mining community” (Renner 2002: 44; 
Wilson-Roberts 2001: 25). The influx of these foreign workers saw an increase in socially 
deviant behaviour including alcoholism, rape, robbery, and prostitution, which placed even 
greater strain upon already taxed social structures (Boege 2010: 335). 
 
The Panguna Landowners Association 
In 1979 the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) was formed. This organisation 
consisted of customary landowners in the areas around the mine site, as well as of the mine 
access roads and the tailing areas (May 2004: 276). The PLA formed primarily to provide a 
cohesive body to push for a review of mining compensation agreements. The PLA mobilised 
what has been labelled ‘militant opposition’ to BCL: a minor riot in Panguna, as a result of a 
confrontation between the PLA and BCL, saw BCL attempt to placate local anger through a 
diversified and enhanced system of compensation (Alley 2003: 229; May 2004: 277). 
 
The new compensatory agreement incorporated the existing methods of compensation 
plus new forms of payment including a “price indexing formula for recurring payments” 
(May 2004: 277). Unfortunately the distribution of this compensation package resulted in 
further dispute: the task of dividing the funds between individuals and community benefit 
trusts lead to frictions between local clans, each of whom believed they had a case for greater 
sums of payment (Alley 2003: 229). The inability of the people to satisfactorily divide the 
                                                          
2 ‘Redskin’ is a degrading term used to describe mainland Papua New Guineans. It refers to the reddish hue of 
their skin, in contrast to the much darker skin colour of Bougainvilleans. 
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compensation “added to the inter-generational and clan differences” which existed within the 
PLA (Alley 2003: 229). This disagreement highlighted a growing divide between the older 
and younger generations of Bougainvilleans: the younger generations resented the presence 
of BCL on the island and on their land, but also held the belief that older generations had 
stepped aside and essentially acquiesced to the BCL “takeover” of their property. Many also 
believed that the older Bougainvilleans had seized and diverted the compensation thus far 
received to serve their own purposes (May 2004: 277). 
 
Within this chaos and discord, a challenge for the PLA leadership took place. As a 
result, the New Panguna Landowners Association was formed in 1979, and the advent of the 
New PLA marked a new era of landowner militancy against BCL and the Papua New Guinea 
government (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 26; Alley 2003: 230). The New PLA was headed by 
Perpetua Sereo and her younger cousin, Francis Ona: both were members of the 
aforementioned ‘younger generation’ and were severely disillusioned by the existing policies 
of compensation distribution (Alley 2003: 230; May 2004: 278).  
 
In April 1988, with the support of the Bougainville provincial governor, Joseph 
Kabui3, the New PLA released a list of demands which included: 
 
 An environmental compensation claim for 10 billion kina (at the time 
almost US$10 billion); 
 
 A 50% share in BCL profits; 
 
 Consultation on all new development projects; and 
 
 Localisation of the ownership of BCL within 5 years (Alley 2003: 230). 
                                                          
3 Francis Ona was a former employee of BCL at the Panguna mine. He became disillusioned with the mine after 
his family received scant compensation for their land (Regan 1998: 277). Both Francis Ona and Joseph Kabui 
would become two of the most prominent figures in the Bougainville conflict, the subsequent peace process, 
and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. 
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There was strategic reasoning behind the release of these demands: in making their 
list of demands intentionally excessive, the New PLA was assured of their rejection. This was 
intended to, and succeeded in, stirring local animosity towards BCL, and lessening the local 
standing of BCL amongst the Bougainvillean people (Alley 2003: 230; Wilson-Roberts 2001: 
27). 
 
The Beginning of Violence 
In early 1988 the atmosphere on Bougainville had begun to shift from one of protest 
to one of insurgency. In March 1988 a landowner delegation, led by a militant faction of the 
New PLA, marched on BCL to outline their demands. From the viewpoint of the protestors 
the compensation offered by the company was not sufficient, and they later staged a series of 
sit-ins at the mine. These actions not only caused mining operations to halt for several hours, 
but protestors also robbed the BCL’s store of explosives. These explosives were intended to 
be used in attacks designed to shut down the mine indefinitely: however an appearance by the 
national minister for minerals and energy managed to halt these attempts (May 2004: 278). 
Despite the early intervention of the national government the situation rapidly intensified, 
following a public meeting in November 1988. A report prepared by an external consultancy 
declared that pollution from the Panguna mine was not responsible for the deaths of fish 
stocks and flying foxes, which served as popular foods for the Bougainvilleans. At this 
announcement many locals, including Francis Ona, stormed out in disgust (May 2004: 279). 
 
It was during this time that violent campaigns of sabotage were launched against the 
mine site, essentially marking the beginning of what would become a decade-long protracted 
conflict. Within days of Ona irately leaving the public meeting, he and his men armed 
themselves and robbed the BCL magazine, taking substantial quantities of explosives. Over 
13 
 
the course of the next few weeks the New PLA launched a series of violent attacks against 
the Panguna mine and its staff: mine installations fell victim to numerous arson attacks; a 
repeater station was destroyed; power pylons were levelled; and fires were lit at several BCL 
maintenance outposts. In addition, mine workers who were undertaking repairs at the mine 
were also threatened by large groups of armed men (May 2004: 279; Wilson-Roberts 2001: 
26). In the aftermath of these events it was noted that the attacks were characterised by high 
levels of professionalism, and many wondered how an essentially ad hoc rebellion could 
conduct such attacks: it was subsequently revealed that a member of the rebellion, Sam 
Kauona, was a former Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) soldier and explosives 
expert (May 2004: 279). As a direct result of the intense and continued campaign of sabotage 
against the mine, BCL were forced to shut the Panguna mine in May 1989, and it remains 
closed to this day (Boege 2010: 26). 
 
In June 1989, following the forced closure of the mine, the Papua New Guinea 
government declared a state of emergency. It was at this time that companies of the PNGDF 
were deployed to the island: the reaction of the Papua New Guinean government was 
excessive and “a gross over-reaction”: the use of the PNGDF and police forces to crush the 
uprising with heavy-handed means solidified the desire of Bougainvilleans to gain 
independence, and escalated the scale and bloodshed of the conflict (Ewins 2002: 3). 
 
The PNGDF were characterised by ill-discipline and the exercising of extremely poor 
judgement in the course of their duties. The PNGDF committed what have been labelled 
“appalling and often random human rights violations” (Regan 1998: 277). These atrocities 
included the rape of local women; physical assaults against villagers; summary and extra-
judicial killings; and the burning of entire villages (Regan 1998: 277). These actions 
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infuriated Ona, who gathered about him a “rapidly expanding group of followers” (Regan 
1998: 278). The New PLA morphed into the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), who 
became the mechanism of militaristic retaliation and resistance against the PNGDF and the 
central Papua New Guinea government (Ganguly 2003: 12). 
 
 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army and Secession 
The BRA had its initial roots within the context of the issues surrounding the Panguna 
mine. As BRA leader Francis Ona stated: 
 
 “We see that all Bougainville is on top of one big mine. This has been 
proven by aerial surveillance that most parts of Bougainville is on top of a 
large mineral resource. My people want to preserve their land, want to 
preserve their rights, with this in mind we are standing for independence. 
Because only through independence will all this mining be under control. If 
PNG government takes back Bougainville, both the PNG and Australian 
governments, who have interest in Bougainville on an economic basis, with 
the mining companies and all this. They will come back and establish those 
big mines and people’s lives will be in danger” (Coles-Janess 1997). 
 
 
The disorganisation and lack of accountability of the newly-independent Papua New 
Guinea government were evident in the actions of their troops. The PNGDF went so far as to 
use helicopters to assault villages from the air and dumped the bodies of militants into the 
ocean4 (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 26; Regan 2001: 277). As a consequence of these actions the 
BRA began to expand their numbers. The BRA, and Ona himself, became a standard around 
which angry landowners could rally. The then-premier of Bougainville, Joseph Kabui, noted 
that “the people see Ona as some kind of folk hero and champion of the Panguna land rights 
cause” (May 2004: 279). The strongest support for the BRA was derived from angry and 
                                                          
4 As the crisis raged throughout the 1990s the Australian government kept watch over the situation and took a 
“neighbourly interest” in seeing its former colony resolve the conflict. However the Australian government 
received considerable criticism when it was revealed that the PNGDF has used an Iroquois helicopter, provided 
by the Australian military, to attack Bougainvillean villages from the air (Ewins 2002: 4).  
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frustrated young men; as a result of limited access to education, and issues surrounding 
economic growth and job prospects (much of which was remnant of the colonial period), this 
demographic in particular had few employment or economic opportunities, and these 
conditions magnetised them towards the BRA, which provided them with both power and 
status (Regan 1998: 277).  
 
Ona and a close group of advisors soon developed an official ideology for the BRA, 
and it is within this ideology that we begin to see a shift away from exclusively mining-
centric concerns and towards xenophobia and secession (Regan 1998: 278). They determined 
that the challenges and problems facing Bougainville were the fault of outsiders, namely 
“BCL, the national government and non-Bougainvilleans generally – together with wealthy 
Bougainvilleans and the ‘white mafia’ who controlled the Papua New Guinean economy” 
(Regan 1998: 277). The ideology of the BRA had broad appeal to the people of Bougainville: 
it addressed their concerns and anxieties about the rapid changes occurring on the island, 
promoting the egalitarian way of life, and that by returning to their customary roots they 
would once again have equality (Regan 1998: 277). 
 
Failed Ceasefire and the Government Blockade 
In an attempt to bring about the cessation of hostilities, Prime Minister Namaliu 
endeavoured to negotiate a settlement including offers of compensation and development 
assistance (Regan 1998: 277). These offers were rejected outright by the BRA, due in large 
part to the horrendous conduct of the PNGDF. In March 1990, having failed to quell the 
hostilities on the island, the Papua New Guinea government declared a ceasefire and 
withdrew its entire force from Bougainville. The central government subsequently imposed a 
total blockade of the island, which prevented all goods and services from reaching 
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Bougainville, patrolling the coastline with ships, and cutting off all government services 
(Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27; Alley 2003: 230). 
 
The imposition of the blockade had an extreme impact on the innocent civilians of 
Bougainville. In the absence of government provisions there was an increase in local food 
production to compensate for the decrease in supplies, but it was in the area of health that the 
impact was most dire: with the government ceasing its provision of medical supplies and 
preventing the Red Cross from intervening, the “scourge” of tropical diseases returned to the 
island (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27; Coles-Janess 1997). As a direct result of the blockade 
thousands of people would lose their lives to illness and malady (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27). 
The government blockade had an asymmetric impact upon those who had not been involved 
in the original fighting: what began as localised fighting in central Bougainville over mining 
issues had dire consequences for the entire island (Boege 2010: 335). 
 
The Fracturing BRA 
In an attempt to move towards sustainable civilian governance and the international 
recognition of Bougainvillean sovereignty, Ona established the Bougainville Interim 
Government (BIG) in May 1990. This was an effort by Ona to remedy his belief that the 
militaristic government of the BRA would not gain any support or recognition from the 
international community. The BIG was headed by the self-appointed President Ona5, and 
Vice-President Joseph Kabui (Regan 1998: 278). The BIG issued a declaration of 
independence shortly thereafter, declaring Bougainville to be the independent Republic of 
Me’ekamui – a gesture which was rejected outright by the Papua New Guinea government 
(Alley 2003: 230).  
 
                                                          
5 Given his new Presidential status, the BRA was headed by Ona’s former lieutenant, Sam Kauona. 
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Of critical note is that the BIG had very little control over the BRA leadership, and 
neither the BRA nor BIG exerted much control over the fighters of the BRA (Regan 1998: 
278). Since its creation the BRA had lacked the organisation and discipline necessary to truly 
be a progressive political force on Bougainville. Francis Ona was “more of a philosopher or 
mystic than warrior, administrator or policy maker”, and as a consequence he lacked the 
capacity to impose unity upon the BRA (Regan 1998: 278). The BRA founders continued to 
develop the ideology of the BRA, which manifested a deep distrust of all aspects of the 
‘modern world’, from formal education to economic development and medicine (Regan 
1998: 278). It is clear from this philosophy that the BRA had no realistic vision for the future 
of Bougainville, and would ultimately do far more harm than good. In due time the BRA 
began to fracture into multiple factions, each with their own goals and motives, but 
universally marked by a capacity for violence. 
 
It was reported that by the early 1990s there were three identifiable factions of the 
BRA: the original militant PLA and local landowners; members of an anti-government and 
cultist group; and groups of petty, thuggish criminals (May 2004: 279). The absence of the 
PNGDF on Bougainville ironically created an increase in violence and destruction. Whereas 
originally the BRA had been engaged in conflict with the PNGDF, now, without a common 
enemy, the ethno-nationalist nature of the conflict dissipated (Regan 1998: 278). Many of 
these fractured elements of the BRA began persecuting groups whom they now perceived as 
their immediate enemies within Bougainville itself. The wealthy; the well-educated; officials 
of senior government; non-Bougainvilleans and any person suspected of being in league with 
the national government faced harassment, imprisonment, torture or execution. The island 
also experienced an escalation in inter-community conflict: ‘wealthy’ villages were burned to 
the ground, and any villagers accused of breaking the ‘Standing Orders’ of the BRA were 
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punished (Regan 1998: 278). In the face of this conduct, the breakdown of security on the 
island, the depraved lawlessness of so many BRA units and the deprivation resulting from the 
blockade, it is not surprising that what little unity there was on Bougainville became even 
more tenuous, and support for the BRA rapidly began to fall in many areas across 
Bougainville (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27; Regan 1998: 278). 
 
 
Return of the PNGDF 
In late 1990 the leaders of the northern island of Nissan placed a request with the 
Papua New Guinea national government to re-deploy the PNGDF to their island, in order to 
protect them from the BRA (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27). The Papua New Guinea government 
approved this request and the PNGDF returned to Nissan and Buka islands where, after 
engaging the BRA for more than a year, the PNGDF were able to retake control of the area. 
Shortly thereafter, inspired by the Buka example, Bougainville experienced the widespread 
formation of militias opposing the BRA. These militias became known as the ‘Resistance’6, 
and were composed of opponents of the BRA as well as defected BRA fighters (Wilson-
Roberts 2001: 27; Alley 2003: 231). The Bougainville conflict was entering what was 
possibly its most violent and destructive phase. After their successful campaign to retake 
Buka, and at the request of local authorities, the PNGDF returned to the north and southwest 
of the main island in 1991-1992. During this time the PNGDF committed many abuses of 
human rights: though of little comfort to the victims, the PNGDF were more disciplined than 
during their previous deployment, which in turn made it difficult for the BRA to rebuild their 
support base (Regan 1998: 279). 
 
                                                          
6 The Resistance were armed by the Papua New Guinea government and the PNGDF, and also received 
additional funding and equipment from the central government (Alley 2003: 232). 
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The fighting soon intensified between the PNGDF, the Resistance and the various 
landowner and criminal factions of the BRA. In addition to these divisions, BRA and 
Resistance members would often sporadically change allegiances; different units within the 
BRA and the Resistance would often take to fighting each other over purely local issues, 
which had no bearing upon the wider context of the rebellion. It is little wonder that, as time 
progressed, the crisis became eminently more convoluted and the battle frontiers became 
unclear (Boege 2010: 335). The inevitable toll of human lives and destruction of property 
reached such an extent that ‘care centres’ were established across the island (Alley 2003: 
231). These facilities were designed to harbour those who had been displaced due to BRA 
intimidation or because of PNGDF destruction of their homes (Alley 2003: 231). At the care 
centres security was provided by the Resistance, and, somewhat ironically, by the PNGDF. 
The conditions within the camps were sub-human, and the continuing ill-discipline of the 
PNGDF resulted in numerous problems for the refugees. They were fearful of the BRA, 
resentful of the PNGDF, and the residents ultimately became “the true victims of the 
conflict” (Regan 1998: 279). It is estimated that by 1997, 67,300 internally displaced citizens, 
40% of the population, were seeking refuge within these care centres (Alley 2003: 231). 
 
Escalating Conflict 
In the wake of the 1992 national elections, the newly-elected Prime Minister Wingti 
grew impatient at the slow pace of resolution on the issue of Bougainville itself. The 
approach of the new administration was to expedite matters through increased military 
initiatives to retake the Panguna mine and the provincial capital (Regan 1998: 280). The 
efforts of the PNGDF to free more areas from rebel control resulted in large casualties for 
both the BRA and PNGDF, and increased suffering for civilians (Regan 1998: 280). As the 
BRA assault against the advance of the PNGDF and Resistance forces intensified, the number 
of casualties soared. The PNGDF, still plagued by weak control systems and sub-standard 
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command, were now under increased military pressure: consequently, the incidences of 
human rights abuses climbed steeply. The entire island was embroiled in a violent and 
torturous battle to which a swift or efficient resolution was not possible. 
 
The mid-1990s saw numerous attempts at reconciliation through the enactment of 
ceasefires, the holding of peace conferences, and the removal of the government blockade. 
Ona and the BRA opposed the ceasefire and many of the senior leaders from the BRA and 
BIG did not attend the peace conferences (Regan 1998: 280). In late 1995, however, the BRA 
and BIG did agree to a meeting which was held in Cairns, Australia. Unfortunately, as these 
representatives were returning to Bougainville by boat, they were attacked by PNGDF troops. 
To this day it is not clear as to whether this assault was authorised by the national 
government (Regan 1998: 281). 
 
The BRA retaliation against the PNGDF was swift and violent, resulting in the 
national government lifting the ceasefire and resuming military operations. The subsequent 
massacres of both BRA and PNGDF personnel, and the killing of Bougainville Premier 
Theodore Miriung by PNGDF troops, fuelled the desperation for progress to be made towards 
a lasting peace (Regan 1998: 281). With the national elections looming, the pressure for 
progress led to Prime Minister Chan taking the heavy-handed and short-sighted step of 
engaging international mercenaries, in the hope of crushing the rebellion on Bougainville 
(Dorney 1998). In January 1997, Chan signed a secret contract with Sandline International, a 
private military consultancy based in London and South Africa (Regan 1998: 282). At a cost 
of 50 million kina ($US36 million), Sandline would provide mercenary troops and high-tech 
equipment, and train local PNGDF soldiers, to re-enter Bougainville and destroy the BRA 
while simultaneously re-taking the Panguna mine. The operation faced opposition from the 
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PNGDF commander, General Singirok, who was both afraid of the high risk to civilian life, 
and resentful that such money had been spent on an external agent (Dorney 1998). However, 
before the mercenaries could launch their operation, they were driven out of Papua New 
Guinea by the PNGDF and their commander. The national government bore the brunt of 
criticism from external and internal parties, at having dared use such an extreme, external 
solution to a domestic issue. Because of this backlash, and facing a judicial inquiry, Prime 
Minister Chan and two additional ministers were forced to stand down7 (Dorney 1998; Regan 
1998: 282). 
 
De-escalation of Violence and the Bougainville Peace Agreement 
In the aftermath of the Sandline Affair, the Papua New Guinea government undertook 
a seismic change in its approach. The acting Prime Minister, John Giheno, declared his 
support for a negotiated cessation to hostilities, in lieu of a continued military approach. The 
sentiments expressed by the Prime Minister helped to foster the conditions necessary to 
facilitate the peace process. The subsequent national election saw Bill Skate elected as Prime 
Minister: a result which enabled the first steps towards peace to be taken (Regan 1998: 282). 
 
The Bougainville Peace Agreement (the BPA) was an accord signed in Arawa on 30 
August 2001. The BPA was signed by the combined assemblies of the Bougainville Interim 
Provincial Government and Bougainville People’s Congress, and the Papua New Guinea 
National Executive Council (NEC) (Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001: 1). The primary 
aim of the BPA was to bring about an end to the Bougainville Crisis. The BPA was the 
                                                          
7 The Sandline Affair was essentially the ‘final straw’ and marked the last attempt of the Papua New Guinea 
government at broad military incursion into Bougainville. The depth to which the Chan administration had 
sunk, in resourcing external mercenaries, forced both the people and the government to realise that the battle 
had gone too far, and lasted too long. It was a critical turning point in the course of the conflict, and it is 
therefore necessary to provide abridged details of the incident. More comprehensive work on the Sandline 
Affair can be found in Dorney (1998): The Sandline Affair. 
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culmination of several earlier agreements, and consists of new political arrangements for 
Bougainville, and other stipulations designed to foster lasting peace through cooperation. 
 
The BPA was built around three pillars. The first pillar relates to autonomy. The 
Agreement: 
 
“…provides for arrangements for an autonomous Bougainville Government operating 
under a home-grown Bougainville Constitution with a right to assume increasing 
control over a wide range of powers, functions, personnel and resources on the basis 
of guarantees contained in the National Constitution”. 
       
(Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001: 1) 
 
  
The second pillar relates to a referendum on autonomy. In referencing a number of the 
causes and sentiments of combatants during the Crisis, the NEC agreed for Bougainvilleans 
to have the opportunity to determine their own future political status (BPA 2001: 1). The 
referendum may be held no sooner than 10 years, and no later than 15 years, after the election 
of the first autonomous Bougainville Government. The choices of the referendum will 
include independence from Papua New Guinea (BPA 2001: 1). 
 
The third pillar of the BPA relates to weapons disposal. A condition of the autonomy 
arrangement and deferred referendum on independence was for civilians and former 
combatants of Bougainville to surrender their firearms and explosives. The weapons disposal 
plan was to be implemented in stages across Bougainville, with weapons to be stored in 
secure containers supervised by the United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville (BPA 
2001: 2). 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review and Methodology 
 
Concepts of Game Theory 
Game theory is broadly defined as “strategic interaction between players” (Dixit and 
Skeath 2004: 4-5). As a concept game theory provides a tool for the analysis, and potential 
resolution, of conflict. Game theory enables the formulation of strategies to address complex 
challenges and to gain insight into the behaviour of actors in conflicts (Avenhaus 2009: 86-
87). This section provides a general overview of concepts relevant to this case study. 
 
Players and Rules 
The Bougainville conflict was a complex scenario which consisted of multiple 
factions interacting with each other towards achieving their desired outcomes. The number of 
‘players’ (or actors) engaged in a scenario is an easily quantifiable aspect of game theory. 
Players represent actors who are possessed of free will and who make rational choices within 
the game framework (Brams 2011: 292). Among the most common frameworks are two-
player games. A well-known example of a two-player game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This 
framework was utilised by Axelrod in his computer simulation tournaments (detailed later n 
this chapter), as an analogue for testing the success factors of cooperation. The Prisoner’s 
Dilemma is a scenario in which two people, Player A and Player B, are arrested on suspicion 
of committing a crime. The players are sequestered in separate rooms with no chance to 
communicate. The police interrogate the suspects separately, telling each that they face a 
minimum of three years in prison for committing the crime. However, the police then tell 
each suspect that the know one person has been coerced into committing the crime by the 
other, and that the jail time will be considerably less for the person who confesses if the other 
player remains silent. Therefore the question is how each player will respond, knowing that 
they face considerable jail time if their fellow player defects and betrays them (Dixit and 
Skeath 2004: 90-91). The decision matrix (Fig. 2) provides an analysis of this situation. If 
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both players remain silent (‘denying’ their involvement and therefore cooperating with the 
other player) each receives three years in prison. If Player A supposes Player B will Confess, 
then the best decision for Player A is to Confess (10 years in prison is preferable to 25 years 
in prison). If Player A believes Player B will Deny, then the best decision for Player A is still 
to Confess (one year in prison as opposed to three). The same logic holds true for Player B, 
rendering “Confess” as the dominant strategy. 
 
Fig. 2: Decision matrix 
 
 
 
Multiplayer games, or n-player games, are those which involve three or more players, 
with n denoting an abstract number of players. The addition of multiple players introduces 
higher levels of complexity in player interaction (Colman 1982: 14). Each player, or coalition 
of players, will have their own unique strategies and preferences which must interact with all 
other players in the game. n-player games possess the capacity for players to divide into 
factions (Colman 1982: 143).  
 
Of interest to this thesis is a specific type of n-player game known as collective 
action. The preceding section outlined the nature of two-layer, single-shot games, as used in 
Axelrod’s research. As a real-world example, the Bougainville case is comprised of multiple 
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parties, distilled in to two major cohorts. This enables the research to utilise a collective 
action approach in testing the validity of Axelrod’s findings. Collective action is the scenario 
of individuals forming groups or factions, with the assumed collective intent to achieve a 
common goal (Gilbert 2006: 3). In situations of collective action, individuals can coalesce 
and form supra-individual units. Such units consist of individuals possessing commensurate 
motivations and objectives, or facing similar challenges or conflicts: as such they form a 
“single moving power” (Gilbert 2006: 12). Supra-individual units in collective action 
situations serve to, among other things, elicit and enforce cooperation. As McCarthy and 
Meirowitz argue, in instances of interethnic conflict (as with Bougainville and Papua New 
Guinea), cooperation is difficult to sustain: when supra-individual units interact, transgressors 
cannot be singled out for punishment by the other group (McCarthy and Meirowitz 2007: 
264). In such situations two potential strategies can support sustained cooperation: the first is 
known as the spiral equilibrium. In this strategy cooperation can be sustained via the threat of 
group-specific punishment: all members of a group are punished if any members have 
defected. The second strategy is known as the in-group policing equilibrium: in this situation 
there is no cross-group punishment, because each group punishes its own members for 
defecting against the other party (McCarthy and Meirowitz 2007: 264). 
 
However, games of collective action can result in the collective action problem: that 
is, the problem of achieving the best outcome for society as a whole when the personal 
interests of some individuals will lead them to a different outcome (Dixit and Skeath 2004: 
631). When individuals take action in an interdependent situation, many are likely to choose 
strategies which maximise their own short-term benefits, and thus their actions generate sub-
optimal or lower outcomes than may otherwise have been possible (Ostrom 2010: 155).  
There are a range of variables which may lead to the resolution of the collective action 
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problem, in enabling an outcome greater than the deficient, short-term gain sought by 
individuals. These include the size of the groups, the heterogeneity of participants, the 
information available regarding past actions, and whether or not the interaction is likely to be 
repeated (Ostrom 2010: 157).  
 
Actors, in any configuration, are governed by the rules of the game. In general game 
theory it is supposed that actors have some understanding of the rules which are the “guides 
to future courses of action” (North 1990: 66). In many cases these rules are either developed 
or enforced by institutions (Burns and Roszgkowska 2005). Traditional institutions, in the 
case of Bougainville, created the rules of the game which enabled a platform for iterative 
cooperation: without these institutions, new rules would have been necessary at each 
interaction between players. The rules implemented by institutions can assume a range of 
forms, from verbal expressions to enforced behaviour and conduct (North 1990: 67). In the 
case of Bougainville, the rules of the game were a combination of cultural expectations of 
conduct, honour and community, as well as requirements and regulations implemented by 
foreign actors contributing to the peace process. 
 
Iterative Games 
A key consideration of a game framework is its length: does the game consist of a 
single, isolated move, or are there multiple, repeated moves before the game concludes? As 
the name implies, a single-shot game is one in which each player has only one move: they do 
not necessarily have only one option, but rather only one chance to execute their chosen 
option (Dixit and Skeath 2004: 23). Iterative, or repeated games, are more complex. A single-
shot game will yield a single outcome, whereas iterative games consist of multiple stages and 
incorporate various strategies, strengths and weaknesses from each actor. While the Axelrod 
research employed a single-shot framework, the Bougainville case represents a far more 
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complex, iterative framework. The repeated and frequent engagement across a ten-year 
period provides a solid test for the applicability of Axelrod’s work across different scenarios. 
A critical aspect of these interactions concerns end-game effects. In single-shot games actors 
are unlikely ever to interact again, and will therefore seek to maximise their own personal 
gains without concern for the future (Axelrod 1984: 10). In iterative games the future is 
extremely important: each actor knows they will be interacting for a period of time (either 
defined or undefined) and the decisions they make now will have bearing on the future. End-
game effects impact specifically upon iterative games of defined length: if actors know that 
the game will end at move n, their dominant strategy will be to defect at n-1. In this instance, 
given that defection is imminent at n-1, the dominant strategy is also to defect at n-2. This 
logic holds true throughout the entire game, creates an echo that essentially makes defection 
the dominant strategy for the entire game and making cooperation highly unlikely (Axelrod 
1984: 10). As such, games of unknown or undefined length hold the best chance of 
facilitating cooperation. 
 
Infinite Horizon 
An infinite horizon situation is defined as “a repeated…game…that has no definite 
end at a fixed finite time” (Dixit and Skeath 2004: 637). As discussed above, in an iterative 
game players take alternate turns until the conclusion of the game: however the assumption 
that a game will take place over a fixed, finite timeframe is often false (Harris 1985: 99). In 
an infinite horizon game the future is essentially open-ended, with the game being repeated 
indefinitely (Magill 1981: 679; Corriveau 2012: 112). The central element of infinite horizon 
is that the end-point of the game is unknown: the “absence of a fixed end-point” effectively 
removes the capacity of one player to exploit another as the game nears its conclusion, and 
requires a more dynamic strategic approach than finite, iterative games (Harris 1985: 99). 
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Fig. 3 represents an infinite horizon scenario. In Fig. 3 the arrow direction represents 
the progression of time continuing to essentially infinity, denoted by i. At this stage of the 
game a decision, D1, is made by a player. This decision is subject to the infinite horizon: at 
the time the decision is made the end-point is not known, and the game is effectively infinite. 
As time progresses (Fig. 4) a decision, D2, is made which establishes the end-point at T, 
thereby transforming the game from one of infinite length to one of finite length. The infinite 
horizon parameter is a core characteristic of the Bougainville case. The time period of our 
analysis, 2001-2010, is an infinite horizon game: during this timeframe the end-point of the 
game (i.e. the independence referendum) has not been determined. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Infinite Horizon pre-endpoint  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Infinite Horizon post-endpoint 
 
 
 
The consequences of infinite horizon scenarios are complex and potentially dire: if the 
decision made at D1 relied upon a game of significant length, but D2 rendered the game much 
shorter, it may have an adverse impact upon the player. The infinite horizon concept 
highlights the extreme complexity inherent in decision-making, and the difficulty in 
calculating the impact of a current decision on any future decisions. Such a model is of 
D1 i 
D1 D2 T 
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particular relevance to areas such as negotiation and peacebuilding, in which a particular 
outcome is desired, but is not established in time, at the commencement of, or part way 
through, negotiations. 
 
Shadow of the Future 
It has been established that defection is the dominant strategy in most situations. 
However it is readily apparent that in global politics, cooperation is a reality. So how is 
cooperation able to manifest in an anarchical system with no central authority and between 
players who have a logical incentive to defect? One critical reason is known as the shadow of 
the future. Although evidence suggests that defection, or non-cooperation, is the logical and 
dominant strategy in single shot games, the chances of cooperation are far greater under 
iterative game conditions (Parkhe 1993: 799). The simple reason for this is that, in iterative 
games, there is a future, and with this future comes the very real threat of punishment and 
retaliation in the face of defection (Bo 2005: 1591). This threat therefore casts a “shadow”, an 
uncertainty on every decision made in the present, and is powerful enough to overcome the 
short-term temptation to defect: when players see future rewards for cooperation and 
punishments for defection, they take a longer-term perspective (Van Lange et al 2011: 858; 
Parkhe 1993: 799). 
 
The shadow of the future is linked with the time parameters of an infinite horizon 
situation. Players will consciously decide to cooperate because the short-term benefits of 
defecting are outweighed by the retribution and punishment that may be inflicted at an 
indeterminate point in the future (Skaperdas et al 1996: 356). Although cooperation can be 
attained via external force, such as the use of fines or threats of violence, this is not necessary 
and does not elicit the type of willing and sustainable cooperation that we are examining 
(White 2003: 151). While the successful emergence of cooperation requires players to place 
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sufficient value upon their future returns, it also requires an indeterminate length of 
interaction (Heide and Miner 1992: 267). If the future holds sufficient value for players then 
the threat of future retaliation will hold considerable weight: but in order for this to occur, the 
length of the interaction must be such that the players do not know when it will end – an 
infinite horizon. Otherwise, if the length of play is known, endgame effects of defection will 
unravel cooperation to the extent that defection is the dominant strategy (Heide and Miner 
1992: 267). The Bougainville case had a considerable shadow of the future. In being an 
infinite horizon scenario, due to the undefined timing of the independence referendum, 
current decisions held incredible weight for the overall peace process. The shadow of the 
future, with its threat of future retaliation, is sufficient to keep players in line so long as they 
are not informed of when the interaction will end ahead of time. 
 
 
Theory of Cooperation 
In a world without a central authority, what compels individuals to cooperate? This 
question has been posited by philosophers, economists, sociologists and political scientists. 
The human condition contains a natural tendency for selfishness and a desire to look after 
one’s self before helping others. However, in spite of this, the entire foundation of human 
society is based upon cooperation and reciprocity. The question then becomes: in situations 
where individuals have incentive to be selfish, how is cooperation able to develop? Each 
individual will propose a different response to this question, which fundamentally conveys 
how we approach our social and political relations. Each differing response reflects our 
willingness to cooperate with others and, in turn, their willingness to cooperate with us 
(Axelrod 1984: 3). The Hobbesian analysis of the state of nature resulted in the assertion that 
society was dominated by selfish individuals who rendered life “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish 
and short” (Axelrod 1984: 4). The corollary of this analysis is that, in the absence of central 
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authority, cooperation cannot develop. However the current global geopolitical system, while 
far from harmonious, demonstrates that it is perfectly possible for cooperation to emerge on 
many different levels, without enforcement from a central authority. 
 
The concept of reciprocal cooperation is ubiquitous in daily life8. Instances of mutual 
advantage and cooperation are countless, yet why do some interactions result in cooperative, 
beneficial outcomes, while others yield defection or recrimination? The primary objective of 
Axelrod’s research was to establish a theory of cooperation which could be used to ascertain 
the factors necessary for cooperation to emerge in a host of environments. If we are able to 
understand the conditions which allow cooperation to emerge, it will become possible to take 
the necessary actions to foster cooperation within a specific setting (Axelrod 1984: 6). The 
theory which emerged is based upon the analysis of individuals who seek to pursue their own 
personal self-interest, with no meta-authority to compel them to cooperate with one another9. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The basic problem of cooperation is that the pursuit of self-interest by each party 
ultimately leads to a poorer outcome for all concerned (Axelrod 1984: 7). In an effort to 
better understand the mechanics of the situations which demonstrate this property, but to 
avoid becoming mired by scenario-specific details, Axelrod employed the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma model. This model (detailed in Chapter 4) is a simple two-player, simultaneous 
                                                          
8 There are numerous examples of cooperation in daily interactions: how often should we invite our peers for 
dinner, if they never invite us in return? A news reporter who receives a leaked story gives positive coverage of 
the source, in the hope of being provided with further stories (Axelrod 1984: 4). The sheer volume of examples 
of cooperation highlights the importance and applicability of cooperation theory. 
9 “A good example of the fundamental problems of cooperation is the case where two industrial nations have 
erected trade barriers to each other’s exports. Because of the mutual advantages of free trade, both countries 
would be better off if these barriers were eliminated. But if either country were to unilaterally eliminate its 
barriers, it would find itself facing terms of trade that hurts its own economy. In fact, whatever one country 
does, the other country is better off retaining its own trade barriers. Therefore the problem is that each 
country has an incentive to retain trade barriers, leading to a worse outcome than would have been possible 
had both countries cooperated with each other” (Axelrod 1984: 7). 
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move game. The game yields four potential outcomes: mutual cooperation; temptation to 
defect; suckers payoff; and punishment for mutual defection. The points awarded for each 
outcome are 3, 5, 0 and 1 point respectively (Axelrod 1984: 8). The elegance of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma lies in its simplicity. Player 1 supposes that their opponent will 
cooperate. They are then required to decide between cooperating (yielding 3 points) or 
defecting (yielding 5 points). In this scenario it pays to defect, in order to maximise their own 
payoff. However suppose they believe their opponent will defect. They now face a choice 
between cooperating (yielding 0 points) or defecting (yielding 1 point). Therefore it is better 
to defect if you believe your opponent will cooperate, and it is also better to defect if you 
believe your partner will defect. While in this scenario Player 1 is best to defect regardless, 
the identical logic holds true for Player 2. Both parties are led to defection as their best 
individual move (yielding 1 point) but sacrificing the 3 points that each would have gained 
had they both cooperated. Individual rationality results in a worse outcome for all than is 
possible, and therein lies the dilemma (Axelrod 1984: 9). 
 
The simplicity of a theoretical Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario adds to its analytical 
benefit, but it neglects a number of real-world factors which would complicate the analysis. 
In their theoretical interactions the players are not afforded the ability to communicate or 
make enforceable threats; there is no way to know what their opponent may do on a given 
move; there is no way to avoid interacting with the opponent and there is no way to change 
the opponent’s payoffs (Axelrod 1984: 12). The analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma without 
these factors helps to elucidate some of the more subtle features of the interaction, which may 
otherwise be lost in the complexity surrounding the decision. 
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Conditions of Cooperation 
Under the conditions specified by Axelrod, words which are not backed by actions are 
so cheap as to be meaningless (Axelrod 1984: 12). The possibility of cooperation developing 
is due to the fact that players may meet one another again. The potential of a repeated 
encounter with the same player means that decisions made today are not made in isolation, 
and may influence and determine later choices in the game. In this regard the future can “cast 
a shadow back upon the present”, thereby affecting the current strategic situation (Axelrod 
1984: 12). In general, however, the future tends to be less important for two reasons: first, 
players tend to value payoffs less as the time of their attainment recedes into the future. 
Secondly, there is always a chance that players will not meet again10 (Axelrod 1984: 12).  
 
The strategies employed by actors, in general, specify which action should be taken in 
any given situation, with the situation itself dependent upon the history of the game thus far 
(Axelrod 1984: 14). In terms of strategy it is tempting to believe that there is a single best 
strategy for any given situation: however the reality is that no best strategy exists independent 
of the strategy being utilised by the other player. Given the history of a game, a strategy may 
cooperate following some patterns of interaction and defect after others (Axelrod 1984: 14). 
In addition the interests of players are not in total conflict. In a game of chess, for example, 
the objective is to win: a win for the victor automatically means a loss for the opponent. 
Unlike this zero-sum configuration, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma it is not safe to assume that the 
other player is explicitly out to get you: the best strategy to employ is directly related to the 
strategy being employed by the other player (Axelrod 1984: 15). It is also of particular 
importance whether the strategies being utilised leave room for the development of mutual 
                                                          
10 While in theory there remains a chance that players will not meet again in the future, this does not hold true 
for the Bougainville case. 
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cooperation. This is vital, as you are unlikely to cooperate with your opponent if you have 
little or no care for future consequences (Axelrod 1984: 15).  
 
The study of cooperative strategies first requires an assessment of the structure of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma itself. The assessment specifically examined which features of reality the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma framework can and cannot cover. Axelrod identified six key attributes 
mimetic of real-world scenarios: 
 
1) The payoffs of players need not be at all comparable; 
2) The payoffs do not have to be symmetric; 
3) The payoffs are relative to one another and do not have to be measured on an absolute 
scale; 
4) The cooperation need not be seen as desirable from the point of view of the rest of the 
world; 
5) There is no need to assume that the players are rational, and may not be necessarily 
attempting to maximise their reward; 
6) The actions of the players are not necessarily conscious choices.  
 
(Axelrod 1984: 17-18) 
 
 
The framework from which Axelrod derives his ultimate findings is sufficiently broad 
enough to encompass not only the interactions of individuals, but those of entire nations 
(Axelrod 1984: 18). The applicability of this model to international affairs provides a tool 
with which to explore the complex interactions and behaviour of nations: it is not always 
possible, or necessary, to assume that actions taken by a nation are rational, or in pursuit of a 
single goal. Rather, their actions are likely the result of an incredibly complex and convoluted 
system of information and political processes (Axelrod 1984: 18). This exemplifies the 
applicability of Axelrod’s findings to the immensely complex and dynamic case of 
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Bougainville: the very complexity of reality makes the analysis of an abstract interaction 
incredibly beneficial in understanding the situation. 
 
The term “evolution of cooperation” is used by Axelrod to label the organic way in which 
cooperation can manifest in a given environment. The evolution of cooperation borrows from 
a biological narrative: people are often involved in situations where effective strategies 
continue to develop and be used, while ineffective strategies are dropped in a survival of the 
fittest-style environment (Axelrod 1984: x). In order for evolution to succeed, actors require a 
sufficiently high likelihood of meeting again, so as to regard the future as equally important 
to, or more important than, the present (Axelrod 1984: 20). Assuming this statement is 
accurate, cooperation may evolve in three stages: 
 
1) It is possible for cooperation to get started, even in a world of unconditional defection. 
It is not possible for cooperation to develop if it is attempted only by scattered 
individuals with virtually no chance to interact with one another. However, 
cooperation can successfully evolve from groups of individuals who base their 
cooperation on reciprocity, and who have even a small amount of interaction with one 
another. 
 
2) A strategy which is based on reciprocity can evolve and thrive in a world where many 
varying strategies are being tried. 
 
3) Once it is established on the basis of reciprocity, cooperation is able to protect itself 
from invasion by strategies which are less cooperative. 
(Axelrod 1984: 21) 
 
 
The Need for a New Approach 
The Computer Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament (the Tournament) was a series of 
matches facilitated by Axelrod, in an effort to answer the question of cooperation. As has 
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already been established, players do not always hold strictly opposing interests; there are 
opportunities for mutual cooperation which will benefit both parties. However, in the 
majority of instances, the dominant strategy is to defect, which results in a poorer outcome 
for all concerned. The Tournament utilised the now well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma 
framework. The Prisoner’s Dilemma, given its ubiquity in international and personal affairs, 
made an ideal framework to analyse. The traits of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, namely mutual 
gains, mutual losses and exploitation, added to its desirability as a test model (Axelrod 1984: 
viii; 27). 
 
In previous psychological studies, the subjects revealed that in the iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, the level of cooperation attained and the means of achieving it were dependent 
upon a range of factors including the attributions of the individual players, the context of the 
game and the relationship between players (Axelrod 1984: 28). The Prisoner’s Dilemma has a 
prominent history in the field of social psychology, but of equal importance is its 
applicability as a conceptual model of social processes. The research which existed prior to 
the Axelrod study was limited: it had relied upon experiments using subjects with no previous 
exposure to the game, and as such their appreciation and understanding of its strategic 
subtleties was limited. In addition, although the test subjects may have possessed ample 
experience of everyday Prisoner’s Dilemma situations, they were naturally burdened by their 
limited capacity to call upon this experience. Furthermore, while the decisions of experienced 
elites have been studied in natural settings, the results are of limited applicability due to the 
relatively slow pace of many high-level and international interactions, and the extreme 
difficulty of controlling for changing circumstances in these environments (Axelrod 1984: 
29). Lastly, studies of strategic interaction have typically incorporated variations of the 
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iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma specifically designed to eliminate or overcome the dilemma 
itself by incorporating changes to the game structure (Axelrod 1984: 29). 
 
Computer Tournaments 
Given the severe limitations and subjectivity of the above aspects, a new methodology 
was needed to discern the means of choosing effectively in a Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario. 
Any new approach would need to understand two specific facts about non-zero-sum game 
settings. Firstly, that which is effective is dependent not only upon the specific characteristics 
of a particular strategy, but also upon the nature and make-up of the other strategies with 
which it must interact. Secondly, any effective strategy must, at any time, be able to 
incorporate the history of the interactions of the game thus far in making its decisions 
(Axelrod 1984: 30). The Tournament invited submissions from professional game theorists. 
Each entrant wrote and submitted a program containing a rule to choose either the 
cooperative or non-cooperative choice on each move. Each program had access to the history 
of the game and was permitted to incorporate this history in making their choices (Axelrod 
1984: 30). The Tournament was structured as a round robin, enabling each entry to be paired 
against every other entry, including its own twin, and against a program designed to 
cooperate or defect with equal probability. The payoffs for each move were the same as in the 
earlier example (3 points for mutual cooperation; 1 point for mutual defection; 5 points for 
defecting when your opponent cooperated; and 0 points for cooperating when your opponent 
defected). 
 
A total of fourteen entries were submitted from a range of disciplines. The round 
robin was run five times to gain a better estimate of each score. In total there were 120,000 
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moves made, constituting 240,000 separate choices11 (Axelrod 1984: 31). Of the entries 
submitted, the winner was a rule named Tit For Tat (TFT). TFT was the least complex rule 
competing in the tournament, and employed a very simple premise: TFT cooperates on the 
first move, and thereafter mimics whatever the opposing player did on the previous move 
(Axelrod 1984: 31). The TFT rule is known to elicit a substantial degree of cooperation 
between human subjects, and follows a system which is easily understood. Prior to the 
Axelrod tournament it was known that TFT was a strong competitor, having secured a first-
place ranking and a second-place ranking in two previous tournaments. This was known to 
the participants of the Axelrod tournament, such that many entrants adopted the TFT 
principle and attempted to build up and improve upon it. Despite their attempts, none of the 
programs of greater complexity were able to perform as well as the original TFT design.  
 
The subsequent analysis of the results revealed that neither the discipline of the 
program author, nor the length or brevity of the program itself, had bearing upon the relative 
success of each rule. It is necessary to delve deeper into the best-and-worst-faring rules to 
find the conditions which contribute to the success of a rule. In the Axelrod tournament, 
which consisted of 200 moves per game, a score of 600 points was deemed to be a “very 
good performance” and is indicative of the score attained by a player in which both sides 
always cooperated with one another. A score of 200 points is indicative of an encounter in 
which neither side ever cooperated. The TFT rule achieved an average of 504 points (Axelrod 
1984: 33). The analysis of the decision rules found a single attribute distinguished the 
relatively high-scoring and low-scoring entries. This attribute has been termed niceness, or 
never being the first to defect12. The nice entries in the tournament achieved average scores 
                                                          
11 For a full account of the tournament, refer to Axelrod “The Evolution of Cooperation” 1994: 27 – 54. 
12 In Axelrod’s original analysis, the definition of niceness was relaxed to include rules which will not be the 
first to defect before the final few moves (Axelrod 1984: 33). 
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between 472 and 504, while those rules which were not nice received, at maximum, 401 
points. Of the top-ranking rules, all eight were nice while none of the other entries possessed 
this characteristic. It is a surprising conclusion that not being the first to defect was a 
characteristic which, by itself, distinguished the most successful rules from the least 
successful (Axelrod 1984: 33).  
 
The subset of nice rules excelled in the tournament primarily because, in performing 
so well with the other nice rules, they were able to markedly increase one another’s scores. 
However when such rules encountered an opposing rule which did utilise defection, each had 
very different response mechanisms. The differing responses played a key role in determining 
the overall success of each rule. In terms of strategic response, those rules which 
demonstrated forgiveness performed best. Forgiveness can be described as a rule’s tendency 
to cooperate in the moves following an opponent’s defection (Axelrod 1984: 36). TFT is 
categorised as a forgiving rule: it is unforgiving for the move immediately following an 
opponent’s defection, but from thereon it is totally forgiving of that defection. The least 
forgiving rule, known as Friedman, was unyielding: in the face of even a single defection, 
Friedman retaliates with total defection for the rest of the game13 (Axelrod 1984: 36). 
 
In the tournament, even expert strategists did not give sufficient weight to the merits 
of forgiveness. A variation of TFT, known as Tit For Two Tats (TFTT), was given to 
contestants as an exemplar program: unbeknownst to them, this rule would have won the 
tournament had it been submitted, which it was not. TFTT improves upon TFT by not 
punishing isolated defections: it is a more forgiving rule. The inability of experts to grasp the 
importance of forgiveness highlights the fallacy of expecting greater gains as a result of being 
                                                          
13 Forgiveness was a key factor in distinguishing between nice rules. TFT was the most forgiving nice rule and 
scored the highest. Friedman was the least forgiving nice rule, and scored lowest (Axelrod 1984: 36). 
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relatively less forgiving than TFT: in reality, there were substantial gains to be made from 
being even more forgiving (Axelrod 1984: 39). 
 
The criticality of forgiveness is yet again demonstrated in the context of echo effects. 
An echo effect is the consequence of a decision reverberating throughout the entire game, and 
essentially making the outcome dependent upon that specific move. Fig. 5 shows the 
consequences of creating an echo. In this game TFT faced a rule known as Joss, a rule which 
always defects following a defection from its opponents, but also defects 10% of the time 
after its opponent cooperates (Axelrod 1984: 36). This minor, exploitative variation of TFT 
had a catastrophic effect on the overall game. Both rules cooperated until the sixth move, 
when Joss chose one of its probabilistic defections. TFT retaliated with a defection, and so 
on, thereby creating an echo back and forth between the players (Axelrod 1984: 37). 
However on the twenty-fifth move, Joss once again chose one of its probabilistic defections, 
to which TFT retaliated. The consequence of this new echo saw both players defect on every 
single move after the twenty-fifth: a single defection triggered a series of recriminations and 
counter-recriminations, rendering the 200-move game essentially decided at move six 
(Axelrod 1984: 37). 
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Fig. 5: Echo effect 
 
 Illustrative Game Between Tit for Tat and Joss 
            
      moves 1 - 20 11111 23232 32323 23232 
moves 21 - 40 32324 44444 44444 44444 
moves 41 - 60 44444 44444 44444 44444 
moves 61 - 80 44444 44444 44444 44444 
moves 81 - 100 44444 44444 44444 44444 
moves 101 - 120 44444 44444 44444 44444 
moves 121 - 140 44444 44444 44444 44444 
moves 141 - 160 44444 44444 44444 44444 
moves 161 - 180 44444 44444 44444 44444 
moves 181 - 200 44444 44444 44444 44444 
      Legend: 1 Both cooperated 
   
 
2 Tit For Tat only cooperated 
  
 
3 Joss only cooperated 
   
 
4 Neither cooperated 
    
 
 
The analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament yielded interesting results 
concerning how to function and cope in a situation of balanced power. However, as has 
already been noted, the efficacy of a given strategy is dependent not only upon its own 
characteristics, but upon the other strategies with which it interacts. Given this condition, the 
results of a single tournament are not conclusive, and a second round was held14 (Axelrod 
1984: 40). The tournament was held in much the same format as the first round, with the 
exception of the end-move. The second round had a 0.00346 probability of ending on any 
given move, as opposed to the finite and pre-set 200-move structure of the first round. This 
alteration served to eliminate end-game effects: since nobody knew when the last move 
                                                          
14 The second tournament attracted 62 entries from six countries. In total there were 3,969 ways in which the 
63 rules were paired, and in contrast to the 120,000 moves in the first round, the second round resulted in 
over one million moves (Axelrod 1984: 43). The scale and robustness of the tournament enforces the validity 
of the tournament results. 
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would come there was no longer a strategic advantage to be gained by exploiting your 
opponent and defecting in the final few moves (Axelrod 1984: 43). 
 
The concept of niceness was once again a property which distinguished winners and 
losers: over half the entries were nice, indicating that entrants had learned from the first round 
and evolved their strategies accordingly. Yet again, there was a significant correlation 
between niceness and how well a rule performed: of the top fifteen rules, fourteen were nice 
(Axelrod 1984: 44). In the second round the nice rules themselves were differentiated by how 
quickly and how reliably they retaliated to an opponent’s defection. By immediately 
punishing the opponent for their defection, as TFT does, a rule demonstrates that it is not to 
be trifled with: were it to be lenient in punishing the defector, the defecting rule may take 
increasing advantage of the rules’ relaxed nature (Axelrod 1984: 44). 
 
In an effort to test the robustness of the TFT strategy, and ultimately the aspects 
which make it so successful, Axelrod constructed a series of hypothetical tournaments to test 
TFT in a variety of environments. The hypothetical tournaments were underpinned by an 
evolutionary narrative: unsuccessful strategies would be unlikely to be used, or to progress, to 
future tournaments. Axelrod analysed what would happen over a series of tournaments if the 
most successful rules became an increasingly large part of the environment, and the less 
successful rules became less so (Axelrod 1984: 48). In this simulation the better a strategy 
performs the greater its representation in the environment, and those rules which achieve the 
least, or have less desirable traits, begin to ‘die off’. This process accurately simulates the 
survival of the fittest paradigm. In the simulation, by the fifth ‘generation’ the lowest ranked 
entries had fallen to half of their original size; the middle-ranking entries sustained their size; 
and the top entries increased. By the fiftieth generation those rules in the bottom third had all 
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but disappeared; much of the middle third had begun to decrease; and those rules at the top 
continued to increase. In this simulation TFT possesses the superior characteristics necessary 
to thrive in the hypothetical evolutionary scenario, and is the most prevalent rule at the 
conclusion of the simulation (Axelrod 1984: 51). 
 
Tit For Tat Superior Attributes 
Throughout the tournament series the TFT rule has shown itself to be superior to all 
its competitors, with its record of success being described as “very impressive” (Axelrod 
1984: 53). The rigorous and robust testing environment solidifies the validity and reliability 
of Axelrod’s findings, and although Axelrod noted that there is no best rule independent of 
the environment, TFT can be labelled a “very robust rule”, based on its empirical successes: 
it performs well in a range of environments, and against a wide variety of opponents (Axelrod 
1984: 53).  
 
As a strategy TFT also benefits from its own clarity: it is a non-complex rule which, 
once encountered, is easily recognised and understood, and its non-exploitability is readily 
apparent. While exploitation can be intermittently beneficial, TFT sacrifices this capability: 
across myriad environments and interactions the dangers of exploitation are many, while 
there are far greater gains to be made in being non-exploitable and clear. None of the entries 
in the tournament succeeded in exploiting the exploitable without paying a high price with 
other, less exploitable rules (Axelrod 1984: 54). 
 
The cooperative success of TFT can be condensed into four characteristics: niceness; 
retaliation; forgiveness; and clarity. “Its niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary 
trouble, its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried, 
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its forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation, and its clarity makes it intelligible to the 
other player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation” (Axelrod 1984: 54). 
 
Methodology 
 
Research Questions 
The previous chapters have outlined the complexity of the Bougainville crisis and 
eventual ceasefire, and have presented the seminal work of Axelrod and the characteristics of 
successful cooperation. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the methodology used to 
answer the research questions of this thesis. 
 
The ultimate goal of the parties involved in the Bougainville crisis, and the 
subsequent period of restoration, was to undertake action which would foster sustainable, 
long-term peace. Cooperation, as the foundation of sustainable peacebuilding, is integral to 
this process. The primary research question of this thesis is: 
 Are the characteristics necessary for the development of successful 
cooperation, as identified by Axelrod, present in post-crisis 
Bougainville, and if so, to what extent? 
 
In addition to this, as time progresses it is logical in ordinary circumstances to expect 
defection to manifest as the endpoint of interaction nears. However, given the state of infinite 
horizon on Bougainville during this time, and the considerable shadow of the future, it can be 
hypothesised that, as time progresses, we will see an increase in cooperative behaviour. 
Therefore the secondary research question of this thesis is: 
45 
 
 As time progresses, do we see more cooperative behaviour being 
demonstrated between actors, or do they experience an increased 
incidence of defective, non-cooperative behaviour? 
 
Data Sample and Process of Collection 
The primary research question concerns the presence of Axelrod’s aspects of 
cooperation in the Bougainville context. However given the isolation of Bougainville there 
are few longitudinal sources of data capable of answering this question. The most reliable and 
comprehensive dataset available was the Papua New Guinea Post-Courier newspaper. The 
Post-Courier was accessed via physical copies and digital articles. The newspaper editions 
from 2001 to mid-2005 were available as full physical editions through the Macmillan Brown 
Library. The later editions were available on the EBSCOHost database: however the database 
only contained digital articles and not full editions of the newspaper. The initial data 
collection stage involved manually searching through approximately 1,500 newspaper 
editions for articles pertaining to the Bougainville conflict and peace process. In this stage of 
the data collection process all such articles were recorded, to ensure no material was 
overlooked. These articles were photocopied and stored in chronological order. The second 
stage involved searching the EBSCOHost database through a further 1,500 articles. The terms 
“Bougainville”, “Bougainville conflict”, “peace”, “Bougainville peace”, “peace process” and 
“Bougainville crisis” were entered into the search engine, for the period August 2005 to 
December 2010. The final count was 1,363 pages of articles sourced from more than 3,000 
newspaper editions. 
 
Qualitative Content Analysis 
The method of analysis used in this thesis is qualitative content analysis (QCA). QCA 
is a method of systematically and objectively analysing and describing cases or situations 
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(Elo et al 2007: 108). QCA is a tool used to test established theories by distilling a potentially 
enormous dataset into a range of discrete categories (Elo et al 2007: 108). These categories, 
contained within a ‘coding frame’, represent a condensed dataset and are used to prove or 
disprove the central research questions. QCA is a method for generating valid and replicable 
findings from qualitative data (Elo et al 2007: 108). The strategy behind a coding frame can 
be generally described as being either inductive or deductive. An inductive coding frame is 
driven by the data, with the categories of coding being derived from the data itself. A 
deductive frame, is used for testing existing theories. In a deductive frame, the categories of 
coding are built based on existing knowledge, and are targeted specifically to the theory 
being tested. This research has utilised a combination of both inductive and deductive 
strategies to create the coding frame. 
 
Variables and Sub-variables 
The coding frame is structured in terms of main categories (variables) and sub-
categories (sub-variables) (Schreier 2012: 58-61). The coding frame, as a means of 
differentiating between the material and different meanings within the material, requires 
accurate and clear variables. The main categories are defined as “the aspects about which you 
would like to know more” (Schreier 2012: 59): that is, they are the central, high-level 
variables which we are seeking to identify within the data. The main categories of this frame 
were generated using a deductive strategy, and were derived from Axelrod’s theory of 
cooperation outlined in Chapter 3. The main categories in the coding frame are: Niceness, 
Forgiveness, Retaliation and Clarity. In addition to these main categories, there are two 
categories designed to capture the data necessary to answer the secondary research question. 
These categories are Demonstrates Cooperative Behaviour and Demonstrates Uncooperative 
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Behaviour. These two categories are essentially frequency counts of the four primary 
categories, capturing the cooperative and uncooperative behaviour chronologically. 
Within each main category are sets of sub-categories, designed to reduce the vast 
quantity of data into condensed, discrete subsets to provide meaningful analysis and 
summation. The sub-categories of the coding frame essentially represent what is said in the 
data about the main categories (Schreier 2012: 61). The sub-categories in this research were 
generated using a combined deductive and inductive approach. This was necessary to 
produce an exhaustive range of sub-categories, because while certain sub-categories were 
obvious from the outset, other sub-categories became apparent as the analysis process was 
conducted. The full range of sub-categories are listed in the finalised coding frame (Appendix 
2). 
 
Structural Requirements for Coding Frames 
Coding frames vary in complexity depending upon the number of main categories and 
sub-categories required. As such the complexity of a coding frame largely depends on the 
research question, which will in turn influence the number of categories that are required to 
answer it. The complexity of a coding frame can range from simple (one main category and a 
group of sub-categories) to high (several main categories and multiple levels of sub-
categories) (Schreier 2012: 63; Bryman 2001: 186). The coding frame used in this research is 
of medium complexity: a range of six main categories supplemented with a series of sub-
categories.  
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In QCA a coding frame must satisfy a range of criteria to ensure its reliability and 
validity. These criteria are: unidimensionality; mutual exclusiveness; exhaustiveness; and 
saturation (Scherier 2012: 75-78). 
i. Unidimensionality: each dimension of a coding frame should consist of only a single 
dimension. That is, each dimension contained within a frame should capture only one 
part of the material, to avoid duplicating or mixing data. 
 
ii. Mutual exclusiveness: sub-categories within a coding frame must mutually exclude 
one another. Within a given main category, a unit of coding must only be able to be 
assigned to a single sub-category. 
 
iii. Exhaustiveness: a coding frame is exhaustive if every unit of coding is able to be 
assigned to a sub-category within the coding frame. The exhaustiveness requirement 
is critical for ensuring a robust coding frame: for the frame to be robust every unit of 
data must be considered, and ensuring that all units are placed within a sub-category 
achieves this. For this reason a “miscellaneous” category is often added to coding 
frames, to capture irrelevant or residual material. 
 
iv. Saturation: the saturation requirement states that coding fames must be constructed so 
that the coding frequency for each category equals 1 or higher: that is, each category 
and sub-category must be used at least once. 
 
The construction of the coding frame itself follows an established process. The first stage 
in this process is the selection of the data. The selection stage is pivotal as it determines 
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which material is relevant and which is irrelevant (Schreier 2012: 81; Bryman 2001: 182). 
The selection strategy used in this research was to breakdown the data by topic, which is a 
useful approach if the data consists of long documents from a narrow range of sources. To 
undertake this process a secondary coding frame was developed, which contained only two 
categories: Relevant Material and Irrelevant Material. This initial coding process reduced the 
more than 1300 pages of data to a set of relevant documents only. The dataset was examined 
thoroughly for relevant and irrelevant material, and sorted manually. At the completion of 
this process the Relevant Material category contained 779 pages of articles, and the 
Irrelevant Material category contained 584 pages of articles. The relevant material was 
retained in chronological order, with each article numbered accordingly. 
 
The second step in the process is to determine the structure of the frame and to 
generate the categories. As previously noted, the main categories in this coding structure 
were generated using a deductive strategy and making use of the existing theory to create the 
categories. Once the structure has been established and the categories have been identified, 
the final stage is to establish specifically what each category means. The definitions of each 
category represent the rules for assigning data to those categories. If the rules of coding are 
not explicit, it will be more difficult to accurately allocate data to each category (Bryman 
2001: 186). Furthermore this will severely reduce the replicability of the research. 
 
In defining a category it is necessary to assign a name, a description and an example 
to each category. The category names provide a label of what each category contains. 
Category names must not be onerously long, and will most likely be established during the 
generation stage of the coding frame. The description of each category describes the features 
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of that category. This is a description of the units of data which belong, and do not belong, in 
each category (Schreier 2012: 96). Once again, these descriptions need to be sufficiently clear 
for the research to be repeated. An additional method of defining the categories is to allocate 
examples to each category. An example of a unit of coding will help to overcome any unclear 
or abstract aspects of the description. These examples are generally taken directly from the 
data used to create the coding frame. When combined, names descriptions and examples 
create a thorough and reliable method of allocating units of data within the coding frame. 
 
Segmentation 
Segmentation is the process of dividing data into smaller, more manageable units for 
coding. Segmentation serves three critical functions: first, it ensures that you have taken into 
account all of your data, by requiring that all units are placed within a dimension of the 
coding frame. Second, it ensures a clear research focus; and third, it allows for comparison of 
the coding either across points in time or between two different coders, thereby ensuring 
reliability (Schreier 2012 126-133; Bryman 2001: 186). Segmentation consists of three main 
types of units. The first are units of analysis: these are synonymous with units of sampling, 
and refer to the units which you are using for your research: in this research, newspaper 
articles are the unit of analysis. Units of analysis are comprised of units of coding: these are 
the smaller blocks that make up the units of analysis, and are what you seek to interpret 
against your coding categories. Lastly, there are context units: in segmentation, as you are 
essentially dissecting your data, it is important to retain a measure of context around the units 
of coding. Context units are a portion of the surrounding information, which enable you to 
maintain the wider context from which the segment of data was sourced. 
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In undertaking the segmentation process, it is necessary to choose criteria in order to 
determine where one unit ends and another begins. This research uses a formal criteria. 
Formal criteria make use of the inherent structure within the data (words, sentences and 
paragraphs) to determine the size of each unit (Schreier 2012: 134). Each newspaper article is 
able to be broken down and coded based on the formal criteria, and allocated to a dimension 
of the coding frame. Once the criteria for segmentation has been established, the next step is 
to proceed with applying the criteria and segmenting the data. It is imperative to clearly 
identify the beginning and end of all units. It is also essential to number all units of coding 
consecutively, to that the data can be tracked and referenced. The segmentation process for 
this research applied a formal criterion to 779 pages of newspaper articles, resulting in 1,028 
units of coding. The data was coded and assigned to the coding frame in two phases, across a 
six month period. The dual coding process resulted in a coefficient of agreement of 97%. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
 
As has been outlined in Chapter 2, Bougainville as a region has experienced 
considerable upheaval in recent decades. The violent bloodshed formally came to an end with 
the 2001 signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, and later the enacting of the 
Bougainville constitution. The subsequent years have been occupied predominantly by 
actions intended to establish Bougainville as a successful, autonomous region, prior to a vote 
for independence expected to take place between 2015 and 2020. In Chapter 3, we saw a 
detailed outline of the work undertaken in cooperation theory by Axelrod, which is ultimately 
condensed into the four characteristics of cooperation shared by successful cooperative 
strategies. Chapter 3 also covered selected important design aspects of the Bougainville 
crisis. As it is an infinite horizon situation with a considerable shadow of the future, the 
uncertainty of future interactions would likely cause the Bougainville and Papua New 
Guinean parties to be more considerate in their conduct, and not allow short-term gains of 
defection to outweigh the potential for either cooperation, or on-going recriminations.  
 
The actors studied in this research have been broadly grouped into two categories: 
“Papua New Guinea” and “Bougainville”. These two categories refer primarily to the Papua 
New Guinea NEC and the interim and later autonomous government of Bougainville, as these 
were the parties most likely to have engaged in the peace process. However given the nature 
of the Bougainville conflict, additional parties are also contained in these two categories, 
primarily on the Bougainville side. The Bougainville category includes the Bougainville 
People’s Congress, the Autonomous Bougainville Government, the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army, the Bougainville Resistance Force, Me’ekamui, as well as other 
individuals and minor groups who have engaged in the peace process. This categorisation is 
primarily relevant to Codes 1.1 and 1.2, which explicitly address defections between or 
53 
 
within these two actors. At its highest level the coding frame takes into account all interaction 
between all parties in furthering the goal of a peaceful Bougainville, and includes parties not 
explicitly classified as Papua New Guinea or Bougainville (for example, the UNOMB). 
 
Primary Research Question 
The primary research question of this thesis is:  
 Are the characteristics necessary for the development of successful 
cooperation, as identified by Axelrod, present in post-war 
Bougainville, and, if so, to what extent?  
 
It is important to note that this research is designed to identify specific instances of 
Axelrod’s characteristics of cooperation, and the overall trend of cooperative and non-
cooperative behaviour: it has not sought to identify direct causal relationships between these 
instances. 
 
Niceness 
Niceness, in general, is the characteristic of not being the first to defect. The coding 
frame encompassed this trait (Codes 1.1 – 1.3), but it was expanded to include “olive 
branches” or an obvious intent to cooperate, as well as unclear defections (Table 1). 
 
Niceness had the highest coding frequency of all four characteristics, with 538 data 
points (45% of the total coding frame). The detailed breakdown of these codes is:  
 
- ‘Papua New Guinea the first to defect’: n=35 (7% of the niceness codes); 
- ‘Bougainville the first to defect’: n=99 (18% of the niceness codes);  
54 
 
- ‘No defection, cooperated on an issue’: n=197 (37% of niceness codes);  
- ‘Olive branch/commitment to cooperate’: n=168 (31% of niceness codes);  
- ‘Unclear defection or criticism against opposing actor: n=39 (7% of niceness codes). 
 
Of the total number of niceness data points (n=538) 68% refer to instances of 
cooperative behaviour, while 32% refer to non-cooperative behaviours. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Niceness coding 
Code: 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1.1: Papua 
New Guinea 
first to defect 6 8 5 4 0 1 2 1 3 5 
1.2: 
Bougainville 
first to defect 14 20 4 5 13 15 6 11 5 6 
1.3: No 
defection 
from either 
actor 40 28 33 33 25 12 4 4 10 8 
1.4: Olive 
branch / 
commitment 
to cooperate 16 14 14 15 15 20 18 18 16 22 
1.5: Unclear 
defection 1 1 0 0 3 17 1 5 2 3 
 
 
Forgiveness 
Forgiveness (Table 2) is the characteristic of being willing to forgive an isolated 
defection. Actors who display forgiveness, while forsaking short-term gain, tend to perform 
better as their willingness to let bygones be bygones can foster ongoing cooperation, as 
opposed to on-going recriminations. 
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Forgiveness had a coding frequency of n=67 (6% of the total coding frame). In 
Axelrod’s original work forgiveness was identified in the “moves after another player has 
defected” (Axelrod 1984: 36). As such the coding frame considered both immediate 
forgiveness (Code 2.1) and forgiveness demonstrated before another move was made 
between actors (Code 2.2), typically within the following seven days. Immediate forgiveness 
accounted for 87% of the forgiveness codes, while delayed forgiveness accounted for 13%. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Forgiveness coding frequency 
Code: 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2.1: 
Immediate 
forgiveness 9 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 6 
2.2: Delayed 
forgiveness 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 
 
Retaliation 
Retaliation (Table 3) is the tendency of an actor to defect immediately following a 
defection from an opposing actor. Retaliatory strategies run the risk of mutual recriminations, 
however the can also be an effective means of deterring an actor who may try to test how 
much defection they can get away with, as retaliatory rules cannot be easily taken advantage 
of. 
 
Retaliation had a coding frequency of n=55 (5% of the total coding frame). Axelrod 
defined retaliation as occurring immediately following a defection, however in a similar 
manner to forgiveness, retaliation was captured whether it occurred immediately following a 
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defection (Code 3.1) or in the following days (Code 3.2). Retaliation that was delivered 
immediately accounted for 93% of the retaliation codes, while delayed retaliation accounted 
for 7%. 
 
Table 3: Retaliation coding frequency 
Code: 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
3.1 Immediate 
retaliation 0 4 2 4 6 0 0 4 3 2 
2.2: Delayed 
retaliation 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Clarity 
Clarity (Table 4) refers to an actor who operates in a consistent manner during the 
course of an interaction, or an actor who acts in accordance with prior statements or conduct. 
If actors behave in a clear manner, each party knows what they can likely expect prior to 
entering negotiations: this enhances the likelihood of cooperation manifesting by reducing 
underhanded or duplicitous conduct. 
 
Clarity was the second-most frequent code, with a coding frequency of n=402 (33% 
of the total coding frame). The detailed breakdown of these codes is:  
 
- ‘Actor acted in a manner consistent with prior conduct’: n=115 (29% of total clarity 
codes);  
- ‘Opponent comments on an actor behaving in an unclear/misleading manner’: n=2 
(0.5% of clarity codes); 
-  ‘Actor unable to discern approach of opponent prior to taking action’: n=1 (0.2% of 
clarity codes); 
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-  ‘Actor clearly outlines view on an issue/intended conduct moving forward’: n=284 
(71% of clarity codes). 
 
Of the total set of clarity data points, an overwhelming 99.3% relate to clear, 
discernible conduct, with only 0.7% relating to unclear behaviour. 
 
 
Table 4: Clarity coding frequency 
Code: 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
4.1: Acted in 
a manner 
consistent 
with previous 
conduct 24 20 17 12 10 14 8 4 3 3 
4.2: Opponent 
comments on 
actor 
behaving in 
an unclear 
manner 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
4.3: Opponent 
unable to 
discern 
opponent’s 
behaviour 
prior to acting 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.4: Actor 
clearly 
outlines their 
intended 
future conduct 43 45 34 19 27 21 15 22 20 38 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The Axelrod characteristics are present to a significant extent within the data. As 
shown in Table 5, 1,028 examples of the characteristics of cooperation occurred across the 
decade of data, with an average of 1.40 instances per article.  
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Table 5: Frequency count 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The presence of the characteristics necessary for successful cooperation is reflected in 
the considerable progress made towards peace during this time, further enforced by the 
overwhelming presence of positive Niceness and Clarity characteristics. During the ten-year 
period covered in this research, Bougainville achieved a number of milestones. The year 
2001 recorded the highest incidence of “cooperation – no defection” coding, which may 
correlate with the successful signing of the BPA during that year15. The signing of the BPA 
was a “significant event” and signified a “lasting end to violence and hostilities, and the 
dawning of a new era that will see [Bougainvilleans] run their own affairs”16.  
 
 The monumental signing of the BPA facilitated further important steps in establishing 
peace on Bougainville, most notably the creation of the Bougainville Constitution, the 
coordinated disposal of weapons, and the election of the first Autonomous Bougainville 
Government (ABG). The Bougainville Constitution commenced development with 
                                                          
15 “Unanimous support from House for B'ville” , Author Unknown, (24/01/2002), p.1, Papua New Guinea Post-
Courier (078) 
16 “Sir Mekere's pledge to work for fruits of deal”, Oseah Philemon, (31/08/2001), p.2 Papua New Guinea Post-
Courier (056) 
“Key to deal with House”, Oseah Philemon, (31/08/2001), p.5, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (054) 
Year Article count Cooperation characteristics count 
2001 76 159 
2002 108 143 
2003 72 109 
2004 69 98 
2005 106 103 
2006 87 101 
2007 47 55 
2008 57 71 
2009 47 96 
2010 61 93 
TOTAL 715 1,028 
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“unanimous support”17 from the NEC in 2002, and was officially presented to the NEC by the 
Governor of Bougainville in 2004. The Constitution paved the way for the election of the 
inaugural ABG, with former premier Joseph Kabui elected as President in June 200518. The 
third pillar of the BPA, the disposal of weapons, also made substantial progress during this 
decade. Several thousand weapons were surrendered to the UNOMB during this time, 
primarily in the early stages of the process19. 
 
 While the decade 2001 – 2010 saw a number of ground-breaking milestones, there 
were also numerous instances of defection, or uncooperative behaviours. These defections 
occurred across a range of areas and contexts. These ranged from procedural and legislative 
defections involving the respective political parties20, to more serious matters involving 
weapons offences. The disposal of weapons on Bougainville, as a pillar of the BPA, was the 
paramount concern for the leaders of both Bougainville and the Papua New Guinea NEC. 
The continued use of weapons on Bougainville, in armed robberies21 or stockpiled by groups 
of criminals22, cast a great deal of doubt on the ability of Bougainville to self-govern23.  
 
There were further examples of defection and uncooperative behaviour demonstrated 
between the Bougainville parties, primarily concerning Francis Ona. The self-proclaimed 
“king” of Me’ekamui frequently changed his attitude towards the peace process, from 
                                                          
17 “Unanimous support from House for B'ville” , Author Unknown, (24/01/2002), p.1, Papua New Guinea Post-
Courier (078) 
18 “President Kabui!”, Gorethy Kenneth, (6/06/2005), p.1, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (350) 
19 “Panguna wants peace”, Eric Tapakau, (18/06/2003), p.7, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (195) 
20 “B'ville leaders angry”, Oseah Philemon, (23/10/2003), p.3, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (221) 
21 “Peace threat: Major robbery smashes Siwai no weapons claim”, Gorethy Kenneth, (30/03/2004), p.1, Papua 
New Guinea Post-Courier (260) 
22 “ABG members irked by guns”, Author Unknown, (19/03/2007), p.5, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (504) 
23 “B'ville trade of guns for drugs a worry”, Author Unknown, (14/01/2009), p.6, Papua New Guinea Post-
Courier (597) 
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offering his support24, to demanding that foreign parties leave Bougainville25. Members of 
Ona’s Me’ekamui faction also established militarised roadblocks to secure his “No-Go-Zone” 
near Arawa26. As evidenced in this analysis, while there were a number of instances of 
defective, uncooperative behaviour, the overwhelming majority of data points represented 
cooperative behaviours.  
 
 
Secondary research question 
The secondary research question of this thesis is:  
 As time progresses, do we see more cooperative behaviour being 
demonstrated between actors on Bougainville, or do they 
experience an increased incidence of defective, non-cooperative 
behaviour?  
 
During the decade covered in this study, Bougainville experienced a state of infinite 
horizon. The duration of the “game” was unknown, as the endpoint (the deferred 
independence referendum) had not been given a specific date. As such, no move is 
necessarily the final move, and the consideration given to the effects of a current move on 
future interactions can lead to more cooperative behaviour than may be expected in a finite 
scenario (Myerson 1991: 308). This uncertainty, the shadow of the future, can foster stable 
cooperation if it is sufficiently large: that is, the importance of the next interaction between 
the same players must be great enough so as to render defection an untenable, or unprofitable, 
                                                          
24 “Ona backs peace”, Gorethy Kenneth, (21/01/2003), p.6, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (171) 
25 “Aussies Out: Reclusive Ona tells AAP: Not welcome in B'ville”, Gorethy Kenneth, (23/03/2005), p.1, Papua 
New Guinea Post-Courier (315) 
26 “Boxes flown into avoid roadblocks”, Author Unknown, (23/05/2005), p.5, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier 
(343a) 
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decision (Axelrod 1984:  In being framed by these parameters, Bougainville is an ideal 
setting for cooperation to evolve and develop. There is no doubt that the parties in question 
will continue to interact, as they have no alternative. They also know that it will be a decade 
or more before any determination is made in the timing of the independence referendum. 
Given the very fertile grounds that Bougainville provides for cooperation, the question 
becomes whether defective behaviour manifested as time progressed, or whether cooperation 
was able to gain a foothold. 
 
In the ten years from 2001 to 2010, there were 851 instances of cooperative behaviour 
and 177 instances of non-cooperative behaviour identified in the dataset. As discussed in the 
primary research question, the number of instances of cooperative behaviour versus non-
cooperative behaviour is likely reflective of the level of progress made in achieving a lasting 
peace through cooperation. In the case of the secondary research question, both cooperative 
and non-cooperative behaviour, ostensibly, decreased in prevalence as the decade drew on 
(Table 6 and Table 7). A closer analysis shows this decrease is due to a lower number of units 
of analysis from 2007 onwards. By comparing the number of units of analysis with the 
number of identified instances of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour, as a ratio, we 
get a more accurate representation of the findings. 
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Table 6: Cooperative behaviour 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Instances 
of 
cooperative 
behaviour 
138 113 100 83 86 67 46 53 86 79 
Units of 
analysis 
72 98 65 62 105 89 48 61 48 63 
Instances 
per unit 
1.9 1.15 1.5 1.3 0.8 0.75 0.95 0.9 1.8 1.25 
  
Table 7: Non-cooperative behaviour 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Instances 
of non-
cooperative 
behaviour 
21 30 9 15 17 34 9 18 10 14 
Units of 
analysis 
72 98 65 62 105 89 48 61 48 63 
Instances 
per unit 
0.3 0.3 0.14 0.24 0.16 0.38 0.19 0.3 0.21 0.22 
 
 
In the early years of the decade (2001 – 2004) there were a series of triumphant 
accomplishments, with the signing of the BPA and the Bougainville constitution. The 
enormous effort required to achieve these monumental successes is reflected in the data: the 
high level of cooperative behaviour and the low level of non-cooperative behaviour 
demonstrated during this time is readily observable. Following this, in 2005 the successful 
election of the first Autonomous Bougainville Government, though not without issue, marked 
a major milestone for the people of Bougainville.  However, following the euphoria of these 
accomplishments, Bougainville moved into a new operating environment. Following the 
enacting of the BPA, the people of Bougainville faced an incredible number of challenges on 
the road to securing sustainable peace: the necessity to cooperate in in the lead-up to the 
aforementioned autonomous elections, to cooperate in implementing and executing a 
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weapons disposal framework, as well as the day-to-day challenges of unifying ex-combatants 
with one another and the civilian population as a whole. The data reveals the high level of 
cooperation which took place during this time, interspersed with non-cooperative behaviour: 
however for every example of non-cooperative behaviour, there were four instances of 
cooperation. The analysis has shown no evidence of an increase in non-cooperative behaviour 
as time progressed. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has provided insight into the capability of previously-warring actors to 
cooperate with the aim of securing a mutually beneficial outcome. Cooperation represents a 
core element of successful, sustainable peacebuilding. In order for peace to be achieved, 
parties who have been in conflict must first demonstrate a willingness to come together and 
work to resolve the causes of their conflict. The Bougainville crisis was a complex, 
multifaceted conflict with roots in economic, ethnic and political tensions. While the genesis 
of the war was the behaviour of the Panguna mining operation, the pre-existing divisions 
catalysed the crisis and led to region-wide devastation. 
 
The overwhelming presence of Axelrod’s characteristics of cooperation, Niceness, 
Forgiveness, Retaliation and Clarity, provides the foundation for a broader method of 
conflict resolution. That is, if we can quantify the specific characteristics required to foster 
cooperation, these can be developed and nurtured in other instances of peacebuilding to 
achieve desirable, mutually beneficial outcomes. Of the four characteristics of successful 
cooperation, Niceness and Clarity represented the majority of occurrences in the data, at 78%. 
Niceness, not being the first to defect, and Clarity, conducting yourself in a clear and 
consistent manner, proved to be highly beneficial and highly successful during the initial 
decade of the Bougainville peace process. If these conditions can be emulated elsewhere, it 
may prove valuable to the development of sustainable peacebuilding in other spheres of war 
and crisis. 
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There was no evidence present in this study to show that as time progressed, defective 
behaviour increased in frequency. Unlike in the case of finite games, the Bougainville crisis 
took place within an infinite horizon setting. This meant that every future move could 
potentially be the last, therefore every current move carries considerable weight and 
uncertainty. This uncertainty, if powerful enough, can overcome the temptation to defect for 
short-term gain. The data showed that, in the vast majority of instances, this temptation to 
defect was overcome and cooperation slowly emerged and successfully began to evolve. 
 
There are certain limitations to this research. The focus of this study is limited to the 
first decade following the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement. This discrete 
timeframe was imposed on the research for practical reasons of managing the volume of data 
involved. It was determined that a ten-year scope of reference would provide sufficient data 
for analysis, with more than 3,000 editions of the Papua New Guinea Post-Courier issued 
during that time. In being reliant entirely upon qualitative data sourced from newspapers, 
there is also the possibility that interactions, conflicts or defections were either not reported 
or overlooked by reporters. However, in the ten years covered, the volume of articles and the 
number of occurrences of the characteristics of cooperation would not indicate a deficit in 
reliable, comprehensive data. 
 
This research has served to illustrate the real-world applicability of Robert Axelrod’s 
theory of cooperation, on the case of the Bougainville crisis. During the course of this study 
Bougainville and Papua New Guinea made immense progress towards sustainable peace, 
enabled by the successful and measurable development of cooperation. The presence of 
Axelrod’s characteristics of cooperation correlates with the achievements made towards 
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lasting peace for the people of Bougainville. If these conditions are reproduced, in other 
regions of conflict and crisis, they may serve to generate genuine and sustainable peace.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of Papua New Guinea Post-Courier newspaper articles 
 
Article no. Title Author Date of 
publication 
Page 
no. 
Publication 
      
001 Minister visits B'ville Author 
Unknown 
5/01/2001 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
002 B'ville talks take on positive step Author 
Unknown 
8/01/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
003 Talks on B'ville must continue Author 
Unknown 
8/01/2001 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
004 A B'ville mother's plea for peace Peter Kili 16/01/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
005 B'ville leaders hope for 
breakthrough in Kokopo meeting 
Peter Kili 23/01/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
006 Breakthrough on B'ville 
referendum 
Author 
Unknown 
29/01/2001 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
007 B'ville to decide own future in 
next decade 
Donald Otto 29/01/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
008 Kabui calls BRA leaders to 
discuss weapons disposal 
Peter Kili 31/01/2001 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
009 Sticky' points keep peace talks in 
limbo - Momis 
Author 
Unknown 
1/02/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
010 Skate: let's go regional Author 
Unknown 
1/02/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
011 NEC approves referendum plan Author 
Unknown 
2/02/2001 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
012 B'ville talks go well Author 
Unknown 
21/02/2001 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
013a Bougainville peace-building tops Author 28/02/2001 5 Papua New 
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agenda Unknown Guinea Post-
Courier 
013b Weapons hinder vote: MP Author 
Unknown 
28/02/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
014 BRA reaffirms support for 
weapons disposal 
Peter Kili 2/03/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
015a B'ville fears suspension Author 
Unknown 
6/03/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
015b Deal on arms disposal Author 
Unknown 
6/03/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
016 Peace talks re-start in capital city Author 
Unknown 
9/03/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
017 Chew it over together for the sake 
of our future 
Anthony 
Siaguru 
9/03/2001 11 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
018 Dialogue on weapons disposal 
must continue until an agreed and 
practical plan is produced: PM 
Mekere 
Morauta 
13/03/2001 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
019 Ona asks for help Peter Kili 20/03/2001  Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
020 Ona call for help raises hopes Author 
Unknown 
21/03/2001 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
021 B'ville talks to be moved to island 
outside city 
Author 
Unknown 
28/03/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
022 B'ville to get one-off grant for new 
govt 
Peter Niesi 4/04/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
024 Minister upbeat on autonomy 
package 
Peter Niesi 9/04/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
025 Ona to take Rio Tinto to court Author 
Unknown 
11/04/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
026 BRA, Resistance sign arms plan Author 
Unknown 
7/05/2001 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
027 B'ville weapons disposal Peter Niesi 7/05/2001 3 Papua New 
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Guinea Post-
Courier 
028 Peace committee gives nod for 
weapons removal plan 
Peter Kili 10/05/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
029 B'ville leaders rally behind 
Minister Avei 
Author 
Unknown 
11/05/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
030 Arms disposal plan Author 
Unknown 
14/05/2001 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
032 Haku people make peace on Buka 
island 
Peter Kili 15/05/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
033 Autonomy talks set Peter Niesi 22/05/2001 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
034 Key Ona adviser arrives for talks Oseah 
Philemon 
24/05/2001 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
035 Key adviser arrives Oseah 
Philemon 
24/05/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
036 B'ville talks focus on defence 
issue 
Peter Niesi 28/05/2001 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
037 Self-rule hopes up Peter Niesi 29/05/2001 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
038 Deal for autonomy in 
Bougainville close 
Author 
Unknown 
29/05/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
039 B'ville pact for signing Peter Niesi 1/06/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
040 B'ville not on agenda Author 
Unknown 
14/06/2001 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
041 Ona gains support Peter Kili 21/06/2001 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
042 No riot squad for B'ville Peter Niesi 26/06/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
044 B'ville assembly accepts treaty Author 6/07/2001 5 Papua New 
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Unknown Guinea Post-
Courier 
045 Cabinet queries minor details Author 
Unknown 
10/07/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
046 Bougainville: the facts Author 
Unknown 
13/07/2001 16 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
047 Kabui sure of autonomy pact 
signing 
Author 
Unknown 
16/07/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
048 Avei off to Buka to finalise 
settlement pact 
Author 
Unknown 
17/07/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
049 Stand-off over renewed talks Peter Kili 18/07/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
050 Officials to start drafting 
agreement for autonomy 
Author 
Unknown 
19/07/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
051 Bougainville arms plan hits a snag Peter Kili 26/07/2001 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
052 House debate on autonomy Author 
Unknown 
29/08/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
053 Make autonomy work, says Avei Ruth Waram 30/08/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
054 Key to deal with House Oseah 
Philemon 
31/08/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
055 Marching to autonomy Author 
Unknown 
31/08/2001 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
056 Sir Mekere's pledge to work for 
fruits of deal 
Oseah 
Philemon 
31/08/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
058 Money goals for autonomy Ruth Waram 31/08/2001 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
061 Historic signing Oseah 
Philemon 
31/08/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
062 Avei urges united push Author 4/09/2001 5 Papua New 
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Unknown Guinea Post-
Courier 
063 Somare expresses doubts on vote Author 
Unknown 
5/09/2001 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
064 Bougainville peace gives special 
meaning to anniversary 
Moi Avei 13/09/2001 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
065 Slowness irks B'ville leader Peter Niesi 14/09/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
066 B'ville agreement on track Author 
Unknown 
26/09/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
067 Disposal kick-started Peter Niesi 7/12/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
068 Avei ready to lobby for support Peter Niesi 10/12/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
069 B'ville MPs call for help with Bills Author 
Unknown 
14/12/2001 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
070 Arms disposal firm Author 
Unknown 
20/12/2001 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
071 Force to withdraw from 
Bougainville 
Robyn Sela 31/12/2001 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
072a Program to restart Author 
Unknown 
7/01/2002 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
072b B'ville 3yr strategic plan ready Author 
Unknown 
7/01/2002 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
073 Weapons disposal gets promoted Author 
Unknown 
11/01/2002 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
074 Ex-combatants agree to weapons 
disposal 
Author 
Unknown 
15/01/2002 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
075 B'ville govt vote to face the test Peter Niesi 16/01/2002 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
076 Amnesty for B'ville goes before Robyn Sela 17/01/2002 2 Papua New 
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court Guinea Post-
Courier 
077 B'ville vote delay was tactical Author 
Unknown 
23/01/2002 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
078 Unanimous support from House 
for B'ville 
Author 
Unknown 
24/01/2002 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
079 B'ville gets vote Author 
Unknown 
24/01/2002 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
080 Bougainville leaders happy Author 
Unknown 
25/01/2002 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
081 Peace on Bougainville Anthony 
Siaguru 
25/01/2002 11 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
082 PNG soldiers recalled, 'evacuated' 
from Bougainville 
Author 
Unknown 
1/02/2002 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
083 No more delays in B'ville aid 
project - EU 
Author 
Unknown 
1/02/2002 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
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Laukau 
25/08/2004 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
285 Progress in arms disposal Gorethy 
Kenneth 
1/09/2004 30 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
286 Kabui's non-political call Oseah 
Philemon 
15/09/2004 54 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
287 1985 arms destroyed Author 
Unknown 
15/09/2004 55 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
288 52 weapons destroyed in Buin Gorethy 
Kenneth 
22/09/2004 29 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
289 PNG offers plan Author 
Unknown 
5/10/2004 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
290 UN: B'ville poll 'out' Gorethy 
Kenneth 
7/10/2004 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
291 94.4% of weapons destroyed Author 
Unknown 
13/10/2004 29 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
293 Jesus' meets massacre rebels Peter Niesi 20/10/2004 35 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
294 Countdown on arms disposal Eric Tapakau 24/11/2004 30 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
295 Peace effort taking step forward Beverlly 
Puton 
8/12/2004 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
296 UNOMB extends mission Eric Tapakau 29/12/2004 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
297 Optimism for B'ville elections Author 
Unknown 
5/01/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
298 Sir Peter calls for imitative and 
responsibility 
Author 
Unknown 
5/01/2005 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
299 Official handover ceremony in 
Arawa 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
12/01/2005 26 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
300 A new era dawns over 
Bougainville 
Author 
Unknown 
17/01/2005  Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
301 Full steam ahead Author 
Unknown 
17/01/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
302 Unite, work together - Momis Gorethy 
Kenneth 
18/01/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
303 Offices set for election Gorethy 
Kenneth 
26/01/2005 17 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
304 Landowners take over school Author 
Unknown 
31/01/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
305 No role to transfer powers Beverly 
Puton 
9/02/2005 18 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
306 Peace 'under threat' Gorethy 
Kenneth 
10/02/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
307 School in chaos Gorethy 
Kenneth 
14/02/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
308 Tension in Hutjena eased Beverly 
Puton 
15/02/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
309 Groups B'ville meeting 'fruitful' Author 
Unknown 
21/02/2005 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
310a Funding may delay elections Author 
Unknown 
23/02/2005 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
310a Weapons disposal vital Author 
Unknown 
23/02/2005 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
311 Chaos warning Author 
Unknown 
1/03/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
312 O'Neill's warning on chaos Author 
Unknown 
1/03/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
313 Dr Imako appointed new Buka 
General Hospital chief executive 
Romalus 
Masiu 
16/03/2005 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
314 B'ville election preparations on 
track 
Author 
Unknown 
21/03/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
315 Aussies Out: Reclusive Ona tells 
AAP: Not welcome in B'ville 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
23/03/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
316 Religion to hinder voting for 
Tasmans 
Beverly 
Puton 
23/03/2005 19 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
317 Bougainville Constitution 
Determination 
Author 
Unknown 
23/03/2005 20 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
318 Ona's letters received Gorethy 
Kenneth 
23/03/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
319 Ona tells Aussies they are not 
welcome 
Author 
Unknown 
23/03/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
320 Bougainvilleans committed to 
peace - Momis 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
24/03/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
321 Ona demands AFP move out of 
Buka 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
30/03/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
322 Out! Author 
Unknown 
30/03/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
323 North Bougainville chiefs to back 
autonomous polls 
Author 
Unknown 
5/04/2005 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
324 Ona offered leadership Author 
Unknown 
7/04/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
325 Police in B'ville 'can act' on illegal 
arms 
Author 
Unknown 
8/04/2005 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
326 Bougainville ready for historic 
elections 
Romalus 
Masiu 
12/04/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
327 B'ville crisis blames Author 
Unknown 
13/04/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
328 Expats 'causing' B'ville instability Beverly 
Puton 
13/04/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
329 Writs issue set for island polls Gorethy 
Kenneth 
13/04/2005 25 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
330 Kauona: I'm not interested in 
politics 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
14/04/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
331 B'ville enters an historical moment Gorethy 
Kenneth 
15/04/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
332 Eyes on B'ville Alex 
Rheeney 
18/04/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
333 Tanis puts hands up to be 
president 
Author 
Unknown 
18/04/2005 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
334a 130,000 eligible to vote Gorethy 
Kenneth 
20/04/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
334b First Me'ekamui nominee Gorethy 
Kenneth 
20/04/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
335a Momis goes for presidency Author 
Unknown 
21/04/2005 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
335b Kabui misses nomination Author 
Unknown 
21/04/2005 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
336 Campaign begins on B'ville Author 
Unknown 
26/04/2005 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
337 Kabui party attacked Gorethy 
Kenneth 
3/05/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
338a Outrage at Kabui attack Romalus 
Masiu 
4/05/2005 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
338b Me'ekamui assured on 
reconciliation 
Author 
Unknown 
4/05/2005 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
339 Barter: Do not see Bougainville as 
model 
Author 
Unknown 
6/05/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
340 Independence still to come Romalus 
Masiu 
11/05/2005 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
341 B'ville elections start next week Gorethy 
Kenneth 
13/05/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
342 Observers set for polls Author 
Unknown 
18/05/2005 24 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
343a Boxes flown into avoid 
roadblocks 
Author 
Unknown 
23/05/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
343b Taking charge Author 
Unknown 
23/05/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
344a Poll papers sink Gorethy 
Kenneth 
25/05/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
344b Election on schedule Author 
Unknown 
25/05/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
344c ENB voters turned away Annette Sete 25/05/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
344d Ona tones down opposition Author 
Unknown 
25/05/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
345e Common Roll not updated Author 
Unknown 
25/05/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
345 Buin roadblock, only hiccup to 
election 
Author 
Unknown 
31/05/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
346 B'ville president known tonight Gorethy 
Kenneth 
1/06/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
347 Preparations in place for 
inauguration event 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
1/06/2005 32 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
348 A dawn is breaking in 
Bougainville 
Author 
Unknown 
2/06/2005 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
349 Kabui in big lead Gorethy 
Kenneth 
3/06/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
350 President Kabui! Gorethy 
Kenneth 
6/06/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
351a Kabui announces interim cabinet Gorethy 
Kenneth 
6/06/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
351b Momis to court Author 
Unknown 
6/06/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
352 Bougainvilleans have last say in 
results 
Author 
Unknown 
7/06/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
353 So what is the next step for the 
Bougainvillean leadership? 
Author 
Unknown 
7/06/2005 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
354 Momis should accept defeat at 
polls 
Author 
Unknown 
8/06/2005 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
355 Chiefs call for Ona, Kabui to 
reconcile 
Romalus 
Masiu 
8/06/2005 24 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
356 Ona invited to main ceremony Author 
Unknown 
9/06/2005 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
357 Polls writs returned Author 
Unknown 
10/06/2005 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
358 B'ville's new era Gorethy 
Kenneth 
15/06/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
359 Bougainville charts way for PNG Peter Niesi 15/06/2005 11 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
360 Guests arrive for event Beverly 
Puton 
15/06/2005 19 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
361 Let all lean from Bougainville 
crisis 
Author 
Unknown 
16/06/2005 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
362 Economy is main B'ville priority Author 
Unknown 
17/06/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
363 No mine yet Author 
Unknown 
20/06/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
364 Hopes soar on new Govt Author 
Unknown 
22/06/2005 22 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
365 Tough stretch ahead for President 
Kabui 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
22/06/2005 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
366 B'ville says thanks to UN 
observers 
Romalus 
Masiu 
24/06/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
367 B'ville 'exploration' nod Eric Tapakau 24/06/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
368 B'ville cabinet sworn it Beverly 
Puton 
24/06/2005 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
369 Ona: No, no Gorethy 
Kenneth 
1/07/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
370 Let me run B'ville government' Gorethy 
Kenneth 
1/07/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
371 Bougainville, an international 
peace legacy for the UN 
Romalus 
Masiu 
1/07/2005 11 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
372 Ona into gold Gorethy 
Kenneth 
4/07/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
373a Ona lays down conditions for 
'talks' 
Author 
Unknown 
4/07/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
373b UN mission winds down in B'ville Author 
Unknown 
4/07/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
374 Progress: Ona and Kabui need to 
talk 
Author 
Unknown 
4/07/2005 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
375 Bougainville Govt not for sale: 
Kabui 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
7/07/2005 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
376 Official: UN mission on B'ville a 
success 
Author 
Unknown 
8/07/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
377 Appointment of ministers queried Romalus 
Masiu 
13/07/2005 20 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
378 Momis halts petition Gorethy 
Kenneth 
19/07/2005 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
379 Ona is dead Romalus 
Masiu 
25/07/2005 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
380 Me'ekamui, B'ville govt tussle for 
leader's body 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
26/07/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
381 Self-made king leaves legacy Lloyd Jones 26/07/2005 11 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
382 Ona body stays put Author 
Unknown 
27/07/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
383 BCL funds order Dominic 
Krau 
29/07/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
384 Farewell to a brave man Author 
Unknown 
1/08/2005 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
385 Central Bougainville chief is 
acting head of Me'ekamui 
following death of Ona 
Author 
Unknown 
3/08/2005 20 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
386 National day sought Author 
Unknown 
31/08/2005 18 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
387 Govt heavies back in Bougainville Author 
Unknown 
9/09/2005 2 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
388 B'ville joins rest of PNG to 
celebrate 
Gorethy 
Kenneth 
19/09/2005  Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
389 A voice for peace Author 
Unknown 
5/10/2005 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
390 Bougainville no go for mining Author 
Unknown 
5/10/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
391 B'ville sets sights on China Author 
Unknown 
13/10/2005 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
392 BCL ordered to pay K7.9m Author 
Unknown 
18/10/2005 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
393 Peace on agenda Author 
Unknown 
19/10/2005 18 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
394 Panguna mining talks Author 
Unknown 
25/10/2005 25 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
395 Peace and unity call Author 
Unknown 
2/11/2005 24 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
396 Key supervisory body meeting Author 
Unknown 
9/11/2005 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
397 ABG members urges calm Author 
Unknown 
11/11/2005 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
398 Threat to peace Author 
Unknown 
16/11/2005 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
399 B'ville to get K38.8m Author 
Unknown 
16/11/2005 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
400 Deal with China Author 
Unknown 
28/11/2005 39 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
401 ABG decentralising power Author 
Unknown 
21/12/2005 13 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
402 Akoitai cautions on mine deals Author 
Unknown 
3/01/2006 37 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
403 Briefly Author 
Unknown 
6/01/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
404 Cuban help for B'ville Author 
Unknown 
9/01/2006 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
405 UN support for Bougainville 
peace 
Author 
Unknown 
16/01/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
406 Criminals spoil B'ville elections Author 
Unknown 
17/01/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
407 Peace reigns in town Author 
Unknown 
18/01/2006 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
408 Resistance forces: We're not 
involved 
Author 
Unknown 
18/01/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
409 B'villeans told to be patient over 
claims 
Author 
Unknown 
18/01/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
410 UN to raise funds for B'ville govt Author 
Unknown 
24/01/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
411 Making peace their own way Author 
Unknown 
3/02/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
412 Leader urges support Author 
Unknown 
6/02/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
413 Peace, unity big concern on border Author 
Unknown 
7/02/2006 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
414 Bougainville to generate own tax 
revenue 
Author 
Unknown 
21/02/2006 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
415 Panguna revisit mooted Author 
Unknown 
3/03/2006 41 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
416 BCL decision gets support Author 
Unknown 
7/03/2006 24 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
417 Former resistance boss calls for 
fair, honest deal 
Author 
Unknown 
8/03/2006 25 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
418 ABG pays up K50,000 Author 
Unknown 
8/03/2006 25 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
419 One f B'ville's key peace architect Author 
Unknown 
10/03/2006 35 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
420 Mine review for Panguna 
welcomed 
Author 
Unknown 
31/03/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
421 Kabui scoffs at mine talk Author 
Unknown 
3/04/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
422 B'ville has K300m fishing 
potential 
Author 
Unknown 
5/04/2006 13 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
423 Constitution to be put to test Author 
Unknown 
5/04/2006 13 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
424 BRF want payment now Author 
Unknown 
6/04/2006 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
425 Veterans: BCL land is ours Author 
Unknown 
6/04/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
426 Kabui welcomes Americans Author 
Unknown 
12/04/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
427 BCL posts record profit Author 
Unknown 
3/05/2006 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
428 MP remind Parlt of dead Author 
Unknown 
3/05/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
429 B'ville future on land Author 
Unknown 
5/05/2006 43 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
430 Briefly Author 
Unknown 
16/05/2006 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
431 Affirming peace, unity Author 
Unknown 
17/05/2006 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
432 Government back B'ville peace 
push 
Author 
Unknown 
17/05/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
433 B'ville to set new policies Author 
Unknown 
17/05/2006 30 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
434 ABG move may lead to armed 
conflict 
Author 
Unknown 
17/05/2006 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
435 Support for BCL review Author 
Unknown 
18/05/2006 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
436 Peace call in B'ville Author 
Unknown 
19/05/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
98 
 
Courier 
437 B'ville police fret over peace deal Author 
Unknown 
23/05/2006 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
438 New Zealand wants peace process 
to continue 
Author 
Unknown 
24/05/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
439 Re-open mine, says Hannett Author 
Unknown 
24/05/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
440 Visit strengthen ties with province Author 
Unknown 
24/05/2006 18 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
441 No mining policy Author 
Unknown 
1/06/2006 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
442 ABG defends Canada trip Author 
Unknown 
7/06/2006 42 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
443 Bougainville set to celebrate first 
anniversary 
Author 
Unknown 
13/06/2006 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
444 Mine to stay closed Author 
Unknown 
13/06/2006 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
445 Kabui: We're not dealing with 
crooks 
Author 
Unknown 
14/06/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
446 Re-opening mine would start war Author 
Unknown 
14/06/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
447 ABG calls for key functions Author 
Unknown 
16/06/2006 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
448 Bougainvilleans celebrate day Author 
Unknown 
19/06/2006 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
449 ABG leaders honoured Author 
Unknown 
20/06/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
450 B'ville women praised Author 
Unknown 
20/06/2006 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
451 Panguna mine still an issue Author 
Unknown 
21/06/2006 13 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
452 Army to destroy 3400 weapons Author 
Unknown 
23/06/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
453 United Me'ekamui defiant on 
Panguna 
Author 
Unknown 
26/06/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
454 When peace has higher calling Author 
Unknown 
27/06/2006 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
455 Leaders told to maintain B'ville 
peace 
Author 
Unknown 
3/07/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
456 ABG in breach of mine law Author 
Unknown 
3/07/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
457 Please address regions issues Author 
Unknown 
12/07/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
458 Smuggling of firearms a concern Author 
Unknown 
13/07/2006 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
459 B'ville to gain big in budget Author 
Unknown 
18/07/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
460 Ex-combatants bemoan delay Author 
Unknown 
19/07/2006 19 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
461 Ona's legacy still lives Author 
Unknown 
4/08/2006 25 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
462 ABG considers palm oil Author 
Unknown 
10/08/2006 19 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
463 Bougainvillean miners slam secret 
talks 
Author 
Unknown 
24/08/2006 38 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
464 Business slowly returning to 
Panguna area 
Author 
Unknown 
24/08/2006 35 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
465 Panguna landowners not part of 
delegation 
Author 
Unknown 
30/08/2006 29 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
466 Women vital to peace Author 
Unknown 
1/09/2006 38 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
467 ABG pledges support Author 
Unknown 
5/09/2006 14 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
468 Greater autonomy the way 
forward 
Author 
Unknown 
21/09/2006 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
469 Revised budget passed Author 
Unknown 
26/09/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
470 House backs mine opening Author 
Unknown 
3/10/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
471 Call to surrender firearms Author 
Unknown 
5/10/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
472 Panguna owners funded Author 
Unknown 
12/10/2006 29 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
473 Chiefs demand arms clean-up Author 
Unknown 
17/10/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
474 Leaders urge new B'ville Author 
Unknown 
17/10/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
475 Concern raised on weapons Author 
Unknown 
20/10/2006 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
476 Freezing of ABG account forced Author 
Unknown 
19/10/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
477 Legal threat over freeze Author 
Unknown 
23/10/2006 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
478 Peace pact paves way Author 
Unknown 
1/11/2006 17 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
479 Armed force warns ABG Author 
Unknown 
6/11/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
480 MP: New groups threatening 
peace process 
Author 
Unknown 
13/11/2006 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
481 B'ville set for 2007 budget Author 
Unknown 
16/11/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
482 ABG requests transfer of mining 
powers 
Author 
Unknown 
21/11/2006 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
483 Panguna set to reopen Author 
Unknown 
11/12/2006 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
484 Call for peaceful Author 
Unknown 
15/12/2006 14 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
485 NZ praised for peace efforts Author 
Unknown 
15/12/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
486 ABG praises budget effort Author 
Unknown 
20/12/2006 20 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
487 Peace still in limbo Author 
Unknown 
22/12/2006 33 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
488 Peace, unity urged Author 
Unknown 
27/12/2006 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
489 Govt reaffirms B'ville support Author 
Unknown 
29/12/2006 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
490 Claims culture must end Author 
Unknown 
2/01/2007 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
491 B'ville still a priority Author 
Unknown 
4/01/2007 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
492 Mining dept sets priority Author 
Unknown 
18/01/2007 22 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
493 B'ville given top priority Author 
Unknown 
23/01/2007 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
494 B'ville pushes for fifth region Author 
Unknown 
25/01/2007 43 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
495 Leader calls for reconciliation Author 
Unknown 
31/01/2007 17 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
496 BCL told to pay taxman Author 
Unknown 
6/02/2007 27 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
497 B'ville weapons disposal vital Author 
Unknown 
9/02/2007 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
498 New Zealand's TMI Pictures to 
film Bougainville peace process 
Author 
Unknown 
14/02/2007 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
499 Unity call on B'ville Author 
Unknown 
21/02/2007 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
500 BCL posts profit in 06 Author 
Unknown 
27/02/2007 25 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
501 ABG defends business talks in 
Ord River 
Author 
Unknown 
2/03/2007 53 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
502 Expulsion won't affect aid to 
region 
Author 
Unknown 
7/03/2007 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
503 ABG pulls out of Panguna mine 
talks 
Author 
Unknown 
12/03/2007 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
504 ABG members irked by guns Author 
Unknown 
19/03/2007 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
505 Ord River boss visits Buka Author 
Unknown 
21/03/2007 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
506 Guns on B'ville an obstacle Author 
Unknown 
28/03/2007 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
507 BCL plans to return Author 
Unknown 
2/04/2007 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
508 Call for ABG to abide 
Constitution 
Author 
Unknown 
8/05/2007 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
509 B'ville women urged to be 
mediators 
Author 
Unknown 
8/05/2007 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
510 BCL works on plan for Panguna Author 
Unknown 
10/05/2007 31 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
511 Challenge to do away with 
firearms 
Author 
Unknown 
17/05/2007 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
512 Momis decries growth failure Author 
Unknown 
6/06/2007 30 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
513 Talks promised for B'ville mining Author 
Unknown 
11/06/2007 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
514 ABG may opt to use own powers Author 
Unknown 
13/06/2007 29 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
515 Call to promote peace in 
Bougainville 
Author 
Unknown 
15/06/2007 59 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
516 Peace process a success story: 
Kabui 
Author 
Unknown 
15/06/2007 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
517 Bougainville elections hailed 
peaceful 
Author 
Unknown 
9/07/2007 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
518 Kabui seeks Rio Tinto audience Author 
Unknown 
8/08/2007 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
519 BCL lifts six-months profits Author 
Unknown 
14/08/2007 29 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
520 ABG complies with powers Author 
Unknown 
16/08/2007 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
521 Kabui pleased with Somare Author 
Unknown 
20/08/2007 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
522 Rio Tinto seeks review of decision Author 
Unknown 
22/08/2007 25 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
523 Bougainville MPs urged to work 
with ABG 
Author 
Unknown 
10/09/2007 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
524 Milestone for B'ville Author 
Unknown 
14/09/2007 38 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
525 B'ville needs chieftains Author 
Unknown 
19/09/2007 18 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
526 ABG not ready for opposition: 
Sohia 
Author 
Unknown 
28/09/2007 14 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
527 Miners urged to observe rules Author 
Unknown 
2/11/2007 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
528 Kabui makes plea for peace with 
all 
Author 
Unknown 
29/11/2007 13 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
529 B'ville community leaders petition 
ABG 
Author 
Unknown 
4/12/2007 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
530 PNG, NZ ministers meet Author 
Unknown 
5/12/2007 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
531 Peace ceremony plan Author 
Unknown 
11/12/2007 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
532 Positive feedback for peace Author 
Unknown 
18/12/2007 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
533 Reconciliation vital to peace Author 
Unknown 
19/12/2007 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
534 Peace bid set for ex-rebels Author 
Unknown 
19/12/2007 16 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
535 Weapons disposal in the spotlight Author 
Unknown 
20/12/2007 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
536 BCL shareholders support 
takeover 
Author 
Unknown 
28/12/2007 47 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
537 Focus on peace and guns Author 
Unknown 
31/12/2007 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
538 Peace pact may be disrupted Author 
Unknown 
7/01/2008 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
539 The Panguna dilemma Author 
Unknown 
10/01/2008 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
540 Conflict likely between authority 
and B'ville 
Author 
Unknown 
25/01/2008 24 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
541 PM stresses on peace Author 
Unknown 
25/01/2008 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
542 Panguna mine doomed Author 
Unknown 
6/02/2008 29 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
543 Kabui threatens to resign as ABG 
President 
Author 
Unknown 
8/02/2008 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
544 Panguna chief gags mine talks Author 
Unknown 
11/02/2008 26 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
545 $US90m land value for B'ville Author 
Unknown 
18/02/2008 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
546 Kabui urged to protect rights Author 
Unknown 
28/03/2008 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
547 Meekamui concerned Author 
Unknown 
3/04/2008 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
548 Powers already with ABG Author 
Unknown 
8/04/2008 29 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
549 ABG needs help Author 
Unknown 
21/04/2008 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
550 Chan, Kabui to reconcile Author 
Unknown 
29/04/2008 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
551 B'ville on recovery trail Author 
Unknown 
1/05/2008 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
552 Ona wary on ABG talks Author 
Unknown 
12/05/2008 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
553 Bougainville mine push Author 
Unknown 
12/05/2008 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
554 Shareholders of BCL back mine 
restart 
Author 
Unknown 
16/05/2008 25 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
555 Bougainville wants BCL back Author 
Unknown 
22/05/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
556 Leaders mourn Author 
Unknown 
10/06/2008 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
557 Heart attack takes leader Author 
Unknown 
10/06/2008 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
558 Bougainville to continue on Author 
Unknown 
11/06/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
559 Tributes flow in for Kabui Author 
Unknown 
11/06/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
560 Me'ekamui set to reconcile Author 
Unknown 
23/06/2008 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
561 Bougainville leader supports 
mining authority 
Author 
Unknown 
24/06/2008 29 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
562 Kabui's death unites sworn 
enemies 
Author 
Unknown 
24/06/2008 14 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
563 B'ville president by March Author 
Unknown 
26/06/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
564 B'ville govt in big mess: 
Businesses 
Author 
Unknown 
30/06/2008 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
565 Uproar in B'ville parlt Author 
Unknown 
16/07/2008 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
566 ABG in charge of review Author 
Unknown 
16/07/2008 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
567 Crisis experience to be… Author 
Unknown 
30/07/2008 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
568 BCL starts evaluating Panguna re-
opening 
Author 
Unknown 
31/07/2008 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
569 Mine sensitivities are crucial Author 
Unknown 
4/08/2008 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
570 BCL cautious of mine re-opening Author 
Unknown 
6/08/2008 27 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
571 Weapons rife in Wisai Author 
Unknown 
7/08/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
572 Mining tussle to B'villeans Author 
Unknown 
8/08/2008 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
573 Panguna people pledge to 
reconcile 
Author 
Unknown 
12/08/2008 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
574 No reconciliation Author 
Unknown 
22/08/2008 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
575 PLA to continue peace, 
reconciliation awareness 
Author 
Unknown 
27/08/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
576 ABG must put B'ville first, says 
Semoso 
Author 
Unknown 
17/09/2008 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
577 Weapons a problem Author 
Unknown 
20/10/2008 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
578 Leaders to meet Author 
Unknown 
9/10/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
579 Weapons-free district Author 
Unknown 
23/10/2008 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
580 Reconciliation key to B'ville 
development 
Author 
Unknown 
27/10/2008 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
581 Mining office to be set up in 
AROB 
Author 
Unknown 
4/11/2008  Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
582 Kauona to contest leadership Author 
Unknown 
7/11/2008 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
583 ARB urged to choose the right 
leader 
Author 
Unknown 
10/11/2008 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
584 Five vie for B'ville presidency Author 
Unknown 
13/11/2008 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
585 Unity not on island! Author 
Unknown 
26/11/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
586 B'villeans set to vote a leader Author 
Unknown 
2/12/2008 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
587 B'ville Copper keen to reopen 
Panguna mine 
Author 
Unknown 
2/12/2008 27 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
589 Panguna to be part of election 
process 
Author 
Unknown 
10/12/2008 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
590 Don't make empty promises calls Author 
Unknown 
19/12/2008 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
591 Forget differences Author 
Unknown 
22/12/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
592 Panguna unity Author 
Unknown 
22/12/2008 1 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
593 Panguna unity in doubt Author 
Unknown 
23/12/2008 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
594 No names on list, most eligible 
voters miss out 
Author 
Unknown 
24/12/2008 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
595 Tanis is ABG leader Author 
Unknown 
29/12/2008 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
596 Tanis sworn in as president Author 
Unknown 
7/01/2009 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
597 B'ville trade of guns for drugs a 
worry 
Author 
Unknown 
14/01/2009 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
598 ABG President meets Grand Chief 
Somare 
Author 
Unknown 
30/01/2009 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
599 Panguna meet not achieved Author 
Unknown 
30/01/2009 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
600 The dreams and illusions Author 
Unknown 
10/02/2009 16 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
601 Onus on ABG to deal with arms 
sales 
Author 
Unknown 
12/03/2009 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
602 ABG president happy with 
progress 
Author 
Unknown 
12/03/2009 11 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
603 Landowners oppose outside 
interests 
Author 
Unknown 
13/03/2009 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
604 Tanis on peace mission in Buin Author 
Unknown 
23/03/2009 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
605 Me'ekamui vows to lay down 
arms 
Author 
Unknown 
24/03/2009 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
606 Peace key to B'ville future Author 
Unknown 
9/04/2009 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
607 BCL eyes restart of mining ops at 
Panguna mine 
Author 
Unknown 
21/04/2009 31 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
608 Bougainville works at economic 
self-reliance 
Author 
Unknown 
23/04/2009 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
609 ABG to benefit from funds Author 
Unknown 
27/04/2009 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
610 ABG appoints peace minister Author 
Unknown 
7/05/2009 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
611 Leader called for genuine peace Author 
Unknown 
20/05/2009 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
612 Bougainville copper deal to be 
reviewed 
Author 
Unknown 
25/05/2009 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
613 Govt willing to help ABG Author 
Unknown 
15/06/2009 19 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
614 B'ville achieves a lot Author 
Unknown 
17/06/2009 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
615 Leaders meet with Nat Govt Author 
Unknown 
21/07/2009 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
616 Funding high on PNG, ARB 
agenda 
Author 
Unknown 
22/07/2009 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
617 ABG awaits power transfer Author 
Unknown 
24/07/2009 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
618 BCL profit up in six months Author 
Unknown 
10/08/2009 28 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
619 B'ville heading for economic 
growth 
Author 
Unknown 
13/08/2009 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
620 PNG sitting on bomb Author 
Unknown 
21/08/2009 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
621 ABG needs to free weapons for 
peace 
Author 
Unknown 
31/08/2009 21 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
622 Peace structure, plan launched Author 
Unknown 
31/08/2009 19 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
623 ABG in need of funds Author 
Unknown 
2/09/2009 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
624 B'ville members see funds woe Author 
Unknown 
2/09/2009 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
625 Reconciliation going on Author 
Unknown 
17/09/2009 17 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
626 Work together for peace Author 
Unknown 
28/09/2009 16 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
627 President hands off policy on 
Panguna 
Author 
Unknown 
8/10/2009 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
628 Landowners welcome BCL visit Author 
Unknown 
9/10/2009 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
629 B'ville elections in March 2010 Author 
Unknown 
12/10/2009 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
630 Arms stop move Author 
Unknown 
29/10/2009 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
631 Call to work together Author 
Unknown 
29/10/2009 13 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
632 Panguna to benefit ABG and 
national Govt 
Author 
Unknown 
3/11/2009 33 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
633 B'ville progress Author 
Unknown 
4/11/2009 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
634 Peace finally reigns Author 
Unknown 
9/11/2009 16 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
635 Peace reviewed Author 
Unknown 
23/11/2009 19 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
636 ABG queries peace pact breach Author 
Unknown 
26/11/2009 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
637 Bougainvilleans urged to maintain 
peace 
Author 
Unknown 
11/12/2009 18 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
638 ABG projects left to waste Author 
Unknown 
14/12/2009 19 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
639 ABG to query PNG govt Author 
Unknown 
15/12/2009 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
640 Power transfer to ABG soon Author 
Unknown 
17/12/2009 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
641 B'ville autonomy in for study Author 
Unknown 
18/12/2009 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
642 B'ville future in review Author 
Unknown 
18/12/2009 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
643 Referendum for B'ville set to roll Author 
Unknown 
18/12/2009 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
644 B'ville to settle issues Author 
Unknown 
11/01/2010 10 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
645 Me'ekamui meets Momis Author 
Unknown 
3/02/2010 8 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
646 ABG in final meet Author 
Unknown 
25/02/2010 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
647 ABG wants govt to transfer 
powers 
Author 
Unknown 
2/03/2010 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
648 B'ville to get powers Author 
Unknown 
5/03/2010 18 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
649 B'ville referendum on path Author 
Unknown 
8/03/2010 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
650 ABG to get own taxes Author 
Unknown 
18/03/2010 35 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
651 Panguna mine still closed: ABG Author 
Unknown 
19/03/2010 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
652 Me'ekamui and ABG do deal to 
work together 
Author 
Unknown 
19/03/2010 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
653 Economic policy sets path for 
autonomy 
Author 
Unknown 
22/03/2010 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
654 Me'ekamuis set to vote Author 
Unknown 
31/03/2010 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
655 Ex-BRA commanders make peace 
in Buin 
Author 
Unknown 
31/03/2010 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
656 Call for good leaders Author 
Unknown 
12/04/2010 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
657 People to decide on ABG 
referendum 
Author 
Unknown 
23/04/2010 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
658 Untitled Author 
Unknown 
23/04/2010 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
659 Warning on guns out Author 
Unknown 
29/04/2010 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
660 B'villeans told to vote wisely Author 
Unknown 
7/05/2010 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
661 Panguna sitting on time bomb Author 
Unknown 
10/05/2010 17 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
662 Me'ekamui general stands ground Author 
Unknown 
17/05/2010 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
663 Mine a threat to community Author 
Unknown 
18/05/2010 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
664 Momis has big plans Author 
Unknown 
10/06/2010 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
665 Tanis leaves ABG on unsavoury 
terms 
Author 
Unknown 
17/06/2010 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
666 Landowners want Tanis Author 
Unknown 
22/06/2010 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
667 B'ville far from independence Author 
Unknown 
25/06/2010 3 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
668 Committee tables controversial 
'Kabui Model' 
Author 
Unknown 
28/06/2010 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
669 B'ville state of economy riles 
leaders 
Author 
Unknown 
28/06/2010 16 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
670 B'ville economy has potential Author 
Unknown 
30/06/2010 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
671 President outlines action plans for 
Bougainville 
Author 
Unknown 
12/07/2010 9 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
672 Momis to focus on problem areas Author 
Unknown 
19/07/2010 18 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
673 Bougainville Govt discusses 
issues on mining in region 
Author 
Unknown 
20/07/2010 16 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
674 Arms disposal plans lacking Author 
Unknown 
28/07/2010 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
675 B'ville not ready for referendum: 
Momis 
Author 
Unknown 
29/07/2010 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
676 Bougainville far from self-reliance Author 
Unknown 
2/08/2010 42 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
677 ABG plans to raise local revenue Author 
Unknown 
3/08/2010 30 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
678 BCL to meet over Panguna mine Author 
Unknown 
4/08/2010 23 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
679 Referendum to be trialled Author 
Unknown 
9/08/2010 44 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
680 Blueprint for weapons disposal Author 
Unknown 
12/08/2010 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
681 BCL agreement to be reviewed Author 
Unknown 
12/08/2010 12 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
682 Rio Tinto lawsuit heard in the US Author 
Unknown 
23/09/2010 5 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
683 Panguna mine answer to reviving 
economy 
Author 
Unknown 
30/09/2010 24 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
684 B'ville shows the way Author 
Unknown 
30/09/2010 24 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
685 Human rights vital: UN team Author 
Unknown 
14/10/2010 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
686 ABG ask for fund release Author 
Unknown 
18/10/2010 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
687 PM and Momis hold deep talks Author 
Unknown 
27/10/2010 30 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
688 Increasing firearms worry police 
chief 
Author 
Unknown 
28/10/2010 20 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
689 ABG group off to China Author 
Unknown 
28/10/2010 20 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
690 European group wants Panguna 
mine re-opened 
Author 
Unknown 
29/10/2010 46 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
691 MP wants Panguna mine re-
opened 
Author 
Unknown 
2/11/2010 30 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
692 Mining company probe Author 
Unknown 
8/11/2010 7 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
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Courier 
693 Panguna needs to be reopened Author 
Unknown 
10/11/2010 17 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
694 New mine for B'ville Author 
Unknown 
11/11/2010 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
695 Momis returns from China Author 
Unknown 
15/11/2010 20 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
696 Arms disposal plan Author 
Unknown 
15/11/2010 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
697 B'ville misses out - again Author 
Unknown 
18/11/2010 4 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
698 B'ville awaits yearly grants Author 
Unknown 
26/11/2010 46 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
699 Panguna gets the nod Author 
Unknown 
29/11/2010 6  
700 Leaders in a new era for Panguna 
mine 
Author 
Unknown 
30/11/2010 39 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
701 Panguna to be reopened Author 
Unknown 
2/12/2010 26 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
702 BRA's stand on mine reopening Author 
Unknown 
13/12/2010 13 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
703 Bougainville signs MOUs with 
China 
Author 
Unknown 
13/12/2010 6 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
704 Rising prices boost B'ville mine 
hopes 
Author 
Unknown 
29/12/2010 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
705 Miners hope to restart 
Bougainville gold and copper 
mine 
Author 
Unknown 
29/12/2010 15 Papua New 
Guinea Post-
Courier 
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Appendix 2: Coding Frame 
Main Category Sub-Category Description Example 
1. Niceness 
 1.1 Papua New 
Guinea first to defect 
An instance of 
defection in the 
agreed principles 
of the peace 
process on the 
part of Papua 
New Guinea. 
“The withdrawal of security forces on the island [by the National 
Government] is contradictory to an agreement, which states that 
PNGDF should be present on the island when weapons are collected”. 
0082 
1.2 Bougainville first 
to defect 
An instance of 
defection in the 
agreed principles 
of the peace 
process on the 
part of 
Bougainville. 
“Polling for Bougainville will go ahead this Saturday after a faction of 
the Resistance Force lifted threats to stop the elections in the 
province”. 0121 
1.3 No defection 
from either actor 
Both Bougainville 
and Papua New 
Guinea 
successfully 
cooperate to 
achieve a positive 
outcome or make 
progress in the 
peace process. 
“Much has already been done – the leaders of both PNG and 
Bougainville are to be congratulated for their efforts in achieving the 
peace process and starting the implementation work”. 0175 
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1.4 Olive branch / 
commitment to 
cooperate 
 
One party 
expresses intent 
to work / 
cooperate with 
the other party, 
likely in an effort 
to elicit 
reciprocity. 
 
“The next stage of the constitution as it stands is that we are still 
working on some funds from the National Government…we know the 
money is coming, but we don’t know, we have to wait”. 0170 
1.5 Unclear 
defection 
A defection takes 
place, but it is 
unclear who has 
defected first. 
“Bougainville leaders are hoping for a ‘formal breakthrough’ in the 
deadlocked peace talks with the National Government, [when they 
resume] this Thursday”. 0005 
2. Forgiveness 
 2.1 Immediate 
forgiveness 
One party 
immediately 
forgives a 
defection on the 
part of the other 
party, generally at 
their next 
interaction. 
“Mr Kabui described the successful vote as a ‘victory for peace’ ad ‘a 
win-win for the PNG Government and Bougainville’ after the 
‘momentary hiccups’ of the last-minute amendment”.  0080 
2.2 Delayed 
forgiveness 
One party 
forgives a 
defection on the 
part of the other 
party within a 
relatively short 
timeframe, 
usually within the 
following seven 
“When former Prime Minister Sir Julius was elected into Parliament 
as the New Ireland Governor, Mr Kabui asked for an apology from 
him after the Sandline and Bougainville crisis incident”. 0550 
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days. 
 
3. Retaliation 
 3.1 Immediate 
retaliation 
One party 
immediately 
retaliates against 
a defection on the 
part of the other 
party, generally at 
their next 
interaction. 
“The people of Bana have pulled down the “No Go Zone” sign post. In 
retaliation, Mr Ona has imposed a blockade of all medical, school and 
store goods”. 0127 
3.2 Delayed 
retaliation 
One party 
retaliates against 
a defection on the 
part of the other 
party within a 
relatively short 
timeframe, 
usually within the 
following seven 
days. 
 
“‘Several serious incidents against my staff over recent weeks have led 
to the indefinite suspension’ Mr McMahon said. ‘I feel sad that the 
suspension has occurred but the program cannot continue unless there 
is confidence in the safety of staff and property’”. 0127 
4. Clarity 
 4.1 Acted in a 
manner consistent 
with previous 
conduct 
A party engaged 
in the peace 
process behaves 
in such as a way 
that is consistent 
with their 
previous conduct, 
agreements or 
propositions. 
“In making this appeal, I repeat the National Government’s long-
standing invitation to Francis Ona”. 0177 
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4.2 Opponent 
comments on actor 
behaving in an 
unclear manner 
A party deviates 
from their 
previous course 
of action or 
statement of 
intentions. 
“The UN Secretary General’s representative in Bougainville, Tor 
Stenbock, said he only signed the letters presented to him by Francis 
Ona…as ‘being received’. Mr Stenbock made it clear that his signature 
was not to endorse independence, as portrayed by the people who 
accompanied Mr Ona”. 0318 
4.3 Opponent unable 
to discern 
opponent’s 
behaviour prior to 
acting 
A party makes a 
move or decision 
without a clear 
understanding of 
the intended 
response or action 
of the opposition. 
“’I am still waiting for a written assurance from the Resistance Force 
chairman Hilary Masiria even though they verbally assured that there 
shouldn’t be any problems from the forces’”. 0120 
4.4 Actor clearly 
outlines intended 
future conduct 
A party 
definitively states 
their expected 
approach, plan or 
other expectation 
of the peace 
process, or 
expresses their 
expectations of 
the opposition. 
“Bougainville Affairs Minister Moi Avei said yesterday Parliament 
must show…unity…in coming together in Arawa to design the 
[Bougainville Peace] Agreement. And for their part, the Bougainville 
leadership must know promote the agreement in the widest possible 
manner so that their people understand its content and take it as their 
own”. 0062 
5. Demonstrated 
Cooperative 
Behaviour 
 
 5.1 Frequency count 
for instances of 
cooperation 
 
6. Demonstrated 
Uncooperative 
Behaviour 
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 6.1 Frequency count  
for instances of non-
cooperation 
 
7. Miscellaneous  
 7.1 Sundry category 
for all miscellaneous 
data 
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